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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on microeconometrics, networks and economic
development. In the first two essays I focus on developing country settings (Tan-
zania and Nepal respectively) to study how rural villagers form their social net-
works, and how the existence of these informal links impacts their welfare. The
third essay focuses on the international trade of arms to investigate whether the
political orientation of government in power makes any difference to arms export
policy. In particular:
Chapter 1
This chapter takes a network perspective to investigate how rural households form
the links through which they provide and/or get economic support, and whether
the connection structure of the community affects the formation of these links. I
test the hypothesis that indirect contacts matter, that is, agents take into account
not only potential partners’ characteristics, but also their position with respect to
all other agents. A network formation framework with fully heterogeneous agents
is first presented, following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), an estimation procedure
is then proposed and applied to data on a village in rural Tanzania. Results show
that when agents evaluate the net advantage of forming a link they also consider
the relative position and the wealth of indirect partners. This chapter contributes
to both network theory and the literature on risk sharing arrangements in that
it proposes an innovative procedure to estimate endogenous network formation
models, and provides evidence that network structure has an explanatory value
disregarded by all previous studies, which are focused on direct relations only.
Chapter 2
This chapter studies how individuals exchange information with peers and how
this information circulates and spreads through informal channels, focusing on the
role of the community as a bridge for information flows. I concentrate on three ru-
ral villages in Nepal where an educational radio program about family planning
and modern contraception methods is broadcasted. Women can access the infor-
mation in different ways: they can personally listen to the radio program, they can
speak with friends who listen to the radio program, or they can receive indirect in-
v
vi
formation reported from third sources such as friends of their friends. I explicitly
take into account the structure of the community network to show that also the
information reported from third sources is a determinant of the women’s adoption
of modern contraception methods. I then address the issue of link formation and
rule out the potential endogeneity of network, reconfirming that indirect exposure
matters and personal links are an effective bridge for information flows.
Chapter 3
Since all through the XXth century arms have been not only tradable goods, but
also foreign policy instruments, this chapter focuses on countries supplying ma-
jor conventional weapons, and investigates whether the political orientation of
government in power makes any difference to arms export policy. In particular,
I concentrate on democratic exporters to check how the government’s political ori-
entation: right-wing or left-wing has an impact on the quantity of arms supplied to
third countries. For this purpose, a bilateral trade equation is estimated for years
1975-2004 applying a panel TOBIT framework. Results suggest that the exporter’s
chief executive being right-wing has a positive and significant impact on major
conventional weapons´ exports. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency
to lower trade barriers, with its consequences on the deregularization of heavy
industry exports, or a higher economic support toward the armament sector as a
relevant part of national industry.
Chapter 1
The Network Structure of
Informal Arrangements:
Evidence from Rural Tanzania
1.1 Introduction
As social capital theorists have stated long ago1 and economists have realized
relatively recently, a person’s network of contacts constitutes a crucial resource.
This is especially the case for rural communities in developing countries where all
outcomes, from weddings to money lending, are determined by informal, multi-
purpose interactions (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Hoddinott, Dercon and Krish-
nan, 2005). Whenever formal economic and financial institutions lack strength,
people in need are forced to rely on family, friends and associates; therefore in-
terpersonal links also assume an economic value. The most famous example of
mutual support is that of risk sharing arrangements: when households have no
access to credit, either because no institutions provide it or because they cannot
meet the collateral required to enter a formal transaction, private arrangements are
used to stabilize consumption. Risk sharing arrangements usually take the form
of gifts or credits at zero interest rate, which are used to finance primary needs
in face of idiosyncratic shocks as health-related expenses, funerals and court tri-
als. However several other forms of network-based mutual support such as work
parties, sharecropping and oxen sharing have been documented (Hoddinott, Der-
con and Krishnan, 2005; Krishnan and Sciubba, 2005). In all these circumstances,
as Fafchamps and Gubert (2005) also point out, people do not form links specifi-
cally for the economic outcome, but the informal arrangements originate from pre-
existing interpersonal relationships2. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the in-
1See Coleman (1988) and Wilson (1987).
2The same perspective is adopted from a purely theoretical point of view by Bramoulle´ and Kranton
(2005): in their model individuals first set bilateral relations and then use these relations to share income
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terpersonal links that are the basis of all mutual support arrangements, rather than
on the specific outcomes that may originate from them. I investigate how rural vil-
lagers in developing countries form the links through which they provide and/or
get economic support, and whether the connection structure of the community af-
fects the formation of these links. Specifically, the question to be answered is: do
agents choose their partners on the base of their personal characteristics only, or
also for their social position with respect to all other agents in the community?
That is, do indirect contacts matter in the formation of links?
Villages are the most common economic and social structure throughout the
entire developing world. Two-thirds of Sub-Saharan Africans live in rural areas,
and their economic and social life is determined within the borders of their village.
Villages are typically composed by a small number of households whose income is
primarily derived from agriculture; within the village there are no spatial barriers
and information flows are smooth. Since most villages are located far form each
other or in areas where transport is difficult, relations among individuals in the
same village are frequent and complex, while relations with the exterior world are
rare or inexistent. All these features, together with the lack of formal economic and
financial institutions and the massive presence of mutual support arrangements,
make villages the ideal setting to study endogenous network formation. I base my
analysis on data from a village called Nyakatoke, in the Buboka Rural District of
Tanzania at the west of Lake Victoria, where the entire community (as opposed to
the usual random sample of respondents) has been interviewed. In the Nyakatoke
Households Survey all adult individuals were asked”Can you give a list of people
from inside or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally rely on for help and/or that
can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labor?”; I use this piece of information to define
whether a link between two individuals exists and to trace the complete network
architecture of the village. I then propose and implement a theory-based proce-
dure to estimate whether indirect contacts matter in the process of link formation.
From the seminal research done by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and onwards,
network theory, based on game theoretical reasoning, claims that not only direct
contacts, but also the entire graph of indirect contacts is relevant for the formation
or severance of links. However the flourishing economic literature on informal
arrangements seems to disregard the role of the community structure. Several em-
pirical studies on risk sharing identify which variables predict the existence of a
link (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Udry and Conley,
2004), but none of them acknowledges that also indirect contacts may be a deter-
minant of link formation. This chapter fills the hole between these two approaches:
I use data on the village of Nyakatoke to show that not only the characteristics of
direct friends, but also the characteristics of indirect contacts are taken into account
after income shocks are realized; the network is given by the pattern of existing relations where agents
commit to share income, rather than by the transfers themselves.
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when a link is created. In fact a new link also provides access to the larger network
of partner’s friends, and friends of these friends. My results suggest that the rel-
ative position and the wealth of indirect contacts do matter, that is, two potential
partners with the same personal characteristics but with different endowments of
friends are not worth the same.
I first proceed from theory, setting up a framework consistent with the model
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In the model, agents form links among them-
selves, and links provide benefits and involve costs. Links are created by mutual
agreement and individual utility depends on the complete network structure. My
framework differs from the majority of previous models in that it incorporates
heterogeneity along both cost and benefit dimensions. Benefits from links increase
in the wealth of potential partners and depend on the entire network structure,
while costs of links are determined by the social distance between partners. From
this theoretical benchmark I derive testable predictions about the importance of
indirect contacts that I bring to data. Decomposing individual wealth in land and
livestock, not surprisingly I find that agents are more willing to form links if part-
ners are wealthier in terms of land and/or livestock. For what concerns indirect
contacts, data suggests that externalities from indirect land are negative, while ex-
ternalities from indirect livestock are positive. In other words, Nyakatoke villagers
prefer partners who are well endowed with land themselves and have fewer addi-
tional contacts with other landowners, which suggests a competition mechanism.
On the other hand, for livestock a positive externality prevails: good partners are
well endowed in livestock and bring other indirect contacts that are also rich in
terms of livestock. My results therefore show that when agents form links they also
attribute importance to wealth and relative position of all other individuals. This
suggests that network structure has its own importance disregarded by all previ-
ous studies, which are focused on direct relations only. I also argue that whenever
indirect contacts are not taken into account the estimates of direct partners’ char-
acteristics are biased, and what determines the direction of the bias is precisely the
sign of the externalities generated by indirect contacts.
This chapter contributes to both network theory and literature on risk sharing
and other informal arrangements. First, it proposes an innovative procedure to
estimate endogenous network formation models. The second major contribution
is that it highlights the importance of indirect contacts, which is crucial for the full
understanding of the forces behind the creation of links. None of the previous em-
pirical studies explicitly recognizes a role for network architecture itself, with the
only exception of Krishnan and Sciubba (2005). However, while they theoretically
derive the properties of equilibrium networks and then test whether observed net-
works have these properties, I take a different approach, doing a structural analysis
of the network formation model which, to the best of my knowledge, is entirely in-
novative. In fact all previous studies on applied networks take players’ relative
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position as given, and assess its role as determinants of the social outcome (Calvo`-
Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2005; Conley and Topa, 2002; Conley and Udry,
2000), while I estimate the parameters of individuals’ utility function consistent
with a stable network. From a policy point of view, the major lesson of this chap-
ter is that when agents choose the links they want to form they look not only at
potential partners’ income, but also at their social characteristics, that is, their so-
cial connections (friends, and friends of these friends). As Dasgupta (2003) points
out, informal networks have effects that spill over to all areas of economic activity,
and precisely for this reason it is crucial to understand the forces driving network
formation. Understanding informal institutions is necessary to design policy in-
terventions at the micro level and, without good knowledge of the unwritten rules
driving informal ties, the design of social protection policies would simply result
as inappropriate.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 contains a review of the rel-
evant literature. In Section 1.3 and 1.4 the theoretical framework and the data
are respectively presented. Section 1.5 explains the estimation procedure, while
section 1.6 presents empirical specifications and results. Section 1.7 proposes an
interpretation of the major results, while Section 1.8 concludes summarizing the
main findings. Tables and figures are presented in the Appendix A at the end of
the chapter.
1.2 Literature Review
The economic literature on informal arrangements is prevalently empirical and
focused on risk sharing3. Since in village economies insurance takes place not
at the community level but among smaller groups4 (Ravallion and Chau- duri,
1997; Udry, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), several studies have tried to de-
fine the appropriate group for risk sharing and to shed light on the mechanisms
through which these groups are created. These studies agree in pointing out kin-
ship, friendship and neighborhood as the main determinants of risk sharing ar-
rangements. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) investigate how households deal with
shocks in rural Philippines concluding that, due to imperfect commitment and in-
formation asymmetry among villagers, mutual insurance does not take place at
the village level, but in smaller groups of friends and relatives. De Weerdt (2004)
3Among the few theoretical contributions on risk-sharing Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2004) characterize
the properties of stable insurance schemes for exogenously given network structures, and Genicot and
Ray (2003) study the effect of allowing subgroup deviation in risk sharing arrangements.
4As Mace (1991) has pointed out, when there is no private information or liquidity constraints the
optimal insurance scheme would be full income pooling. However this is not observed in reality. Dif-
ferent explanations for this failure have been proposed: Ligon (1998) using data from rural India con-
cludes that information asymmetry is the main obstacle to full risk sharing, while other authors apply
the theory of limited commitment to justify incomplete insurance schemes observed in reality (Coate
and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2000).
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finds that the main variables predicting informal arrangements in Tanzania are
kinship, distance, religion and common friends. On the same line, Dekker (2004)
studies network formation in rural Zimbabwe to identify the types of social re-
lation that are important to establish informal insurance ties. His contribution is
mainly methodological in that he makes use of a dyadic model taking into account
the dependence among observations5. A few contributions also explicitly focus
on the impact of ethnicity: Grimard (1997) finds evidence of a partial consump-
tion smoothing through ethnic lines, and Fafchamps (2003) investigates the role of
ethnicity and networks in African domestic trade, finding no evidence of ethnic
discriminations in agricultural markets. Along similar lines there are the descrip-
tive assessments by Hoddinott, Dercon and Krishnan (2005), Rosenzweig (1988),
and Udry and Conley (2004). Taking a slightly different perspective Goldstein,
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2002) use data on Ghana to identify the characteristics
of people who are more likely to fall outside mutual insurance networks and be
excluded from credit.
None of these contributions explicitly recognize a role for network structure,
with the only exception of Krishnan and Sciubba (2005) whose approach is by far
the closest to the one I propose. They offer a bridge between the theoretical lit-
erature on endogenous network formation and the empirical work on informal
arrangements, stressing the importance of both number of link and network ar-
chitecture in determining the social outcome. Krishnan and Sciubba (2005) anal-
yse labor exchange arrangements for harvesting and weeding in 15 Ethiopian vil-
lages. They modify the co-author model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) allowing
for heterogeneity among agents: in their setting, farmers differ in productivity
and decide with whom they want to form a link; ceteris paribus, a better-endowed
farmer is more appealing for labor sharing but, on the other side, he has lower in-
centive to labor share. Externalities from indirect contacts are negative because a
higher number of partners dilute the effort a farmer can exert in each partnership.
All decentralized decisions determine the structure of equilibrium networks; since
the model admits multiple equilibria, Krishnan and Sciubba identify the common
features shared by any stable network architecture and then check whether labor
sharing arrangements observed in rural Ethiopia are compatible with the model’s
predictions. My approach is analogous, with some important differences: I im-
pose a less restrictive structure of externalities, and allow for heterogeneity both
with respect to costs and benefits. And, most importantly, Krishnan and Sciubba
(2005) test whether the theoretical features of stable equilibria are consistent with
empirical evidence, while I start from the observation of the equilibrium network
to estimate the underlining parameters of the model.
In this chapter I make an extensive use of the literature on endogenous net-
work formation that has been flourishing in the last decade (Jackson, 2003; Jack-
5This is the so-called p2 model proposed by Duijn, Snijders and Zijlstra (2004).
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son, 2005). Models of strategic network formation have originated primarily from
two sources: the random graph literature by physicists6 and the economic liter-
ature aimed to organize the empirical evidence on networks in a game theoret-
ical framework. Some economists have approached network formation from a
non-cooperative point of view (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Galeotti and Goyal, 2002).
However, the majority of research papers focus on stable networks, where links
are formed at the discretion of self-interested agents whose utility is given by the
overall network structure. The analysis of equilibrium networks is based on both
cooperative and non-cooperative considerations, and highlights the tensions be-
tween private incentives and overall efficiency. The reference model by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) will be discussed in depth in Section 1.3.
1.3 The Theory
This section illustrates network games’ basic notations, reviews the relevant pas-
sages of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and presents the model to be estimated.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of players connected in some network relation-
ship. Links are the consequence of agreement between parts. A link is established
and/or maintained only if there is joint consent. The network g describes which
pairs of players are linked to each other: g is a list of unordered pairs of players
{ij} , i, j ∈ N ; {ij} ∈ g indicates that players i and j are linked under the network
g. For any network g, g + ij defines the network obtained by adding link ij to g
and, analogously, g − ij defines the network obtained by deleting link ij. N(g) is
the set of players with at least one link in the network g. Finally, the network gN
is the set of all subsets of N of size 2, usually defined as the complete network,
consequently, G =
{
gN
}
denotes the set of all possible networks on N .
A typical feature of network games is that the total utility generated, and the
way it is allocated among players, depends on the network structure. The utility
of each player not only depends on actions undertaken by his direct partners, but
also on actions undertaken by all other agents. This is summarized by the value
function and the allocation rule. Different network shapes generate different levels
of utility, even if the set of players stays the same: the value function is a function
v :
{
g
∣∣gN}→ R expressing the overall level of utility reached by the group of
players for each network structure. The value function can be used to define the
efficiency benchmark. A network g ⊂ gN is strongly efficient if v(g) ≥ v(g´) for all
g´ ⊂ gN . On the other hand, the so-called allocation rule defines how this overall
value is divided among players. That is, if we define Yi(g, v) as the payoff player
i gets from graph g under the value function V , an allocation rule is a function
Y : G × V → RN such that ∑i Yi(g, v) = v(g) for all g and v. In all that follows
6See Vega-Redondo (2007) and Jackson and Rogers (2006). For a direct approach to physicist litera-
ture I remand to Guimera’ et al. (2003) and Boguna’ et al. (2004).
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the allocation rule is simply the utility that players directly receive, accounting for
both costs and benefits generated by the links they form, which is the natural allo-
cation, ruling out posterior arrangements and side payments.
In order to identify which networks are likely to arise in various contexts, a
notion of network stability has to be imposed. The pairwise stability by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) states that the formation of a link requires the consent of both
parties involved, while severance can be done unilaterally; formally, a network g
is pairwise stable (PWS) if
(i) For all ij ∈ g, Yi(g, v) ≥ Yi(g − ij, v) and Yj(g, v) ≥ Yj(g − ij, v)
(ii) For all ij /∈ g, if Yi(g, v) < Yi(g + ij, v), then Yj(g, v) > Yj(g + ij, v)
That is, a network is pairwise stable if, given the overall network structure, links
which are profitable for both parties are actually formed, and each player does not
benefit in severing any existent link. Pairwise stability does not depend on the
process through which the network is formed. Moreover, it is a relatively weak
concept since it only admits deviations on a single link at a time. Pairwise stability
frequently admits large sets of stable allocations, which may result in the impossi-
bility of drawing policy recommendations. Several refinements to restrict the set
of stable equilibria have been proposed: for instance, group deviations (instead
of pairwise deviations only) may be allowed as in Jackson and Van Den Nouwe-
land (2005); alternatively, side payments between agents may also be implicitly
allowed as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); however, for the purpose of this chap-
ter the pairwise stability concept will be adopted.
The connection model and the co-author model are two concrete network ex-
amples presented in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In the connection model, agents
decide whether to form links, which represent social relationships. Relationships
provide benefits but also involve costs. Players incur a cost for every link they
form; on the other hand, they benefit not only from direct (and therefore costly)
relationships, but also from indirect ones, which are for free. Benefits from indirect
relationships deteriorate with distance: a friend is more valuable than a friend of a
friend, which is more valuable than a friend of a friend of a friend and so on. Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996) focus on a simplified, symmetric version of their general
setting, assuming that every link has the same cost cij = c and provides the same
benefit normalized to 1. The payoff that player i receives from network g thus be-
comes
ui(g) =
∑
j∈N(g)
δtij −
∑
j:ij∈g
cij (1.1)
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with a depreciation rate 0 < δ < 1. tij is called the geodesic distance between
i and j and is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting
tij = ∞ if there is no path between i and j). Thus, player i pays a cost c for direct
connections only, but he also benefits from all indirect ones, in a way that is pro-
portional to the proximity of these indirect partners. The value function is simply
the sum of individual utilities v(g) =
∑
i∈N Ui(g), and the allocation rule assigns
to every player his own utility. As their main result, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
illustrate the relationship between the sets of networks that are efficient and those
that are stable, showing that these two sets do not generally coincide and decen-
tralized decisions do not necessarily lead to an allocation that maximizes collective
utility7. An analogous case is the one depicted by the co-author model, with the
important difference that here indirect connections provide negative externalities.
Agents are interpreted as researchers who spend time writing papers and collab-
orate in common project, where the outcome of the collaboration depends on the
number of links partners are involved into. Since the amount of time a researcher
can spend on any given project is inversely proportional to the number of projects
he is involved in, in the co-author model the individual utility still depends on the
full network structure, but this time indirect connections are detrimental.
In my setting I allow for a flexible structure of externalities and introduce full
heterogeneity among agents, which results in differentiating benefits and costs.
A similar setting has been analysed by Galeotti and Goyal (2002) from a non-
cooperative perspective, however pairwise stable networks with such general fea-
tures have not been theoretically explored yet.
In a community of N = {1, ..., n} agents each agent i ∈ N is endowed with an
income yi and with a vector zi of social characteristics (religion, ethnicity, blood
links, schooling, professional activity etc.). Income of both direct and indirect part-
ners generates externalities, indirect connections are for free and become less valu-
able the more distant they are. The cost of linking is assumed to be increasing in
the perceived social distance, which is based on the partners’ social characteristics.
In fact relationships between people with analogous profiles are relatively easier
to form and maintain, and arrangements between partners with the same socio-
cultural background have smaller enforcement and monitoring costs8. My objects
of study are the unique pairs of agents called dyads with cardinality l =
(
n
2
)
.
Using the information in z let us define a social attributes matrix Zm×l, where m+
are the attributes identifying the relative social position of each dyad. Finally, for
s+ let Ys×n summarize each agent’s wealth yi. Individual utility function from net-
7In particular, for high and low costs efficient networks coincide with pairwise stable ones, while for
the intermediate cases this may not be true.
8Karlan (2001) applies a similar argument to microfinance group-lending programs in the Andes,
and concludes that more homogeneous groups have higher repayment rates due to their higher social
capital and ease of monitoring.
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work g is therefore defined by
ui(g) = yi +
∑
j∈N(g)
δ(tij)αyj +
∑
j:ij∈g
βZij (1.2)
where:
δ : Z+ → R s.t. δ(.) ≥ 0, δ´(.) < 0
tij is the geodesic distance between i and j
α ∈ Rs and β ∈ Rm
In this formulation, agents’ utility depends on the overall network structure,
and externalities from indirect contacts can be positive or negative in sign. I then
proceed to empirics, and propose an estimation procedure to test whether in mu-
tual arrangements an individual’s utility is affected by indirect contacts, as theory
would suggest.
1.4 The Data
Data come from the Nyakatoke Household Survey. Nyakatoke is a small Haya9
village in the Buboka Rural District of Tanzania, at the west of Lake Victoria.
The community is composed by 600 inhabitants, 307 of which are adults, for a
total of 119 households. Inhabitants have been interviewed in five regular inter-
vals from February to December 2000. First all household heads, and a few days
later, all adults were interviewed;10 this has produced a rich dataset containing in-
formation on households’ demographics (composition, age, religion, education),
wealth and assets (land and livestock ownership, quality of housing and durable
goods), income sources and income shocks, transfers and network relations. Even
if some piece of information was collected at the individual level, the 7021 house-
hold dyads are taken as units of analysis.
Informal relationships are a crucial resource for Nyakatoke households, as they
self-report risk sharing via transfers to be the most important coping strategy to
deal with idiosyncratic shocks like sickness, death, crime and court cases, and cer-
emonies (Dercon and De Weerdt, 2006). During the survey all adult households’
members were asked “Can you give a list of people from inside or outside of Nyakatoke,
who you can personally rely on for help and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or
labor?”; this piece of information is used to define whether a link exists and to trace
the village architecture. These links are reciprocal by definition, since people are
9One of the largest tribes at the west of Lake Victoria.
10In order to eliminate possible sources of bias, gender sensitive issues were implemented by enu-
merators of the same sex as respondents.
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asked to mention somebody they can rely on and/or that can rely on them. Also, in-
formal links are bilateral by their own nature since they rely on agreements among
parties involved, and economic help is expected to be reciprocated at some point
in the future. I thus assume links to be unweighted and undirected, and every time
an individual mentions another one I draft a link between the two households they
belong to11. With this procedure 490 links among the 119 households are identi-
fied. The resulting network is dense, with a mean geodesic distance of 2.5 steps
and a maximum geodesic distance of 5 steps. No household is isolated, and the
number of households’ reported links ranges from 1 to 32. The network exhibits
all the empirical regularities of large social networks (small world properties) that
have been described in the empirical literature.12 For a graphical representation of
the Nyakatoke network see Appendix A, Figure 1.A.
Nyakatoke’s village area is small, with an average distance between house-
holds of 523 meters and a maximum distance of 1738 meters. The village is rela-
tively poor, since the consumption for adult equivalent unit is less than 2 US $ a
week and average food share in consumption is about 77% (Dercon and De Weerdt,
2006). Households in Nyakatoke get most of their income from agricultural activ-
ities, especially the cultivation of coffee and banana; other sources of income are
rare and off-farming activities are mostly considered supplementary to farming
(Mitti and Rweyemamu, 2001). The village has no primary school (the closest one
is at 2 km) and overall educational level is low, with 26 households out of 119
where no member has completed primary education.
Social interactions in Nyakatoke are frequent and complex, and the social life
of the community is organized around kin groups, clans and religious associa-
tions. Previous evidence suggests that blood relations are a primal resource for
village households, and this seems also to be the case in Nyakatoke, where for any
wealth level households keep about 30 % of their links within their kin net (see
Appendix A, Table 10.A). Adopting a broad definition of kinship13, the average-
11For the sake of completeness the estimations in Section 1.4 have also been repeated under the
stricter definition of a link: a link exists only if both households explicitly mention each other. Re-
sults are consistent in sign and magnitude but not always in significance, which is not surprising given
the exiguous number of links (140 instead of 490).
12The typical features of large socially-generated networks are the following: a) The number of nodes
is very large as compared to the average number of links; b) The network has an unique component
or a main component covering a large share of the population; c) There are more nodes with a really
low or a really high number of connections than in a network where links are formed uniformly at
random; d) The number of links of connected partners tends to be positively correlated; e) The average
distance between nodes is small and the maximum distance (diameter) is in the order of ln(n), (which
is precisely our case since ln(119) = 4.77); f) The clustering coefficient, which measures the tendency
of linked nodes to have common neighbors, is larger in social networks with respect to the case where
links are generated by an independent random process (for Nyakatoke the clustering coefficient is 0.23,
where in an analogous randomly generated network it would be 0.03). For further details on small
world properties see Jackson and Rogers (2006).
13Two households belong to the same kin group whenever a member of one household has a blood
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size kin group in Nyakatoke counts 6.4 households. All households nowadays
follow modern religions, and are either Muslim, Lutheran or Catholic14. Religion
is a characterizing attribute in Nyakatoke also because the three main formal reli-
gious associations play an active role in the social and economic life of the village,
providing help for funerals and giving support to the church or mosque in cash,
kind or labor (De Weerdt, 2002). Finally, In Nyakatoke there are 26 different clans,
with a variable number of households from 1 to 23. Clan belonging is another in-
fluent social tie because, as De Weerdt (2004) acknowledges, ”(. . . ) the clan is still an
important institution in Haya culture, for example in matters regarding land rights. The
clan elders can, in effect, function as a court of law. They could easily reprimand younger
clan mates when they think their behavior is bad for the clan. Everybody wants to avoid
falling out with their clan”.
It is also worth mentioning that Nyakatoke hosts more than 20 formal insur-
ance groups, mostly aimed to help participants in the event of a funeral, which in
Haya society is an important lump-sum expense. However, these groups follow
a relatively rigid protocol in terms of acceptance, membership and contributions;
therefore they cannot be compared with informal insurance arrangements and are
out of the focus of analysis.
Descriptive statistics about the village are reported in the Appendix A (Table
1.A to 4.A). A detailed description of how variables have been specified in the em-
pirical analysis will come with Section 1.6. For additional information on Nyaka-
toke I remand to Mitti and Rweyemamu (2001) and De Weerdt (2002).
1.5 Estimation Procedure
For each pair of agents15 ij, the dependent binary variable xij equals one if they
are linked. Recalling the linear individual utility function
ui(g) = yi +
∑
j∈N(g)
δ(tij)αyj +
∑
j:ij∈g
βZij + i (1.3)
bond of the kind ”cousin, grandparent or grandchildren” or stricter with a member of the other house-
hold.
14The first settlement in Nyakatoke dates around 1910: at that time most households were still ad-
herents to traditional Bahaya religions. With time, however, the entire village was converted to modern
religions. Presently the area north of the stream is predominantly Catholic; most of the Lutherans are
in the south and Muslims southwest of the village. This distribution is likely to result from mutual
influence between neighbors, which may in principle lead to endogeneity. However, this seems not
to be a problem, because conversion to modern religions was dated much before the surveyed indi-
viduals were born, and because if we omit religious variables from the analysis all major findings stay
consistent (results available upon request).
15Whenever agents are mentioned it should be interpreted as households, since households are the
unit of analysis.
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For an observed network g, α´s and β´s have to be estimated under the con-
straint of pairwise stability, that is, imposing
∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) & uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij) (1.4)
∀ij /∈ g, ui(g) < ui(g + ij)⇒ uj(g) > uj(g + ij)
Under pairwise stability no subgroup deviations or multiple simultaneous de-
viations are allowed, and each agent considers whether to form/sever only one
link at a time. Links are formed and maintained only if both agents involved
agree. In order to decide whether the link ij is profitable each agent takes the
equilibrium network g as given, and he only compares his utility under the two
different scenarios when link ij is formed or not. That is, under pairwise stability
agent i evaluates his utility from link ij taking the structure of g as exogenous, in-
cluding all other links he is involved in (ik and ki, k 6= j) and all other links player
j is involved in (jk and kj, k 6= i). This ceteris paribus condition dramatically sim-
plifies the estimation, since it rules out endogeneity. Therefore, for every dyad ij
the model reduces to a discrete choice form
P (xij = 1) = P (ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) & uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij)) (1.5)
Where for each ij the regressors are calculated on the equilibrium network g
when only the link ij varies. The utility of agent i under the two scenarios is given
by
uiij = yi +
∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tik)αyk +
∑
k:ik∈gij
βZik︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ziij
+iij (1.6)
u¯iij = yi +
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tik)αyk +
∑
k:ik∈gi¯j
βZik
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z¯iij
+¯iij (1.7)
And the utility of agent j by
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ujij = yj +
∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tjk)αyk +
∑
k:jk∈gij
βZjk︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Zjij
+jij (1.8)
u¯jij = yj +
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tjk)αyk +
∑
k:jk∈gi¯j
βZjk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Z¯jij
+¯jij (1.9)
where gij and gi¯j are ad hoc networks constructed for estimation purposes. To
define gij the architecture of g is taken as given for all other dyads except ij, and
additionally ij is assumed to exist. Analogously, gi¯j is constructed by taking the
rest of the network g as given and artificially setting xij = 0.16 Redefining
ziij − z¯iij = ϕiij
zjij − z¯jij = ϕjij
iij − ¯iij = ηiij (1.10)
jij − ¯jij = ηjij
The model reduces to
P (xij = 1) = P (ϕiij + ηiij ≥ 0 & ϕjij + ηjij ≥ 0) (1.11)
Since ηiij and ηjij represent omitted factors17 affecting the utility that individ-
uals i and j respectively get if link ij is formed, a joint distribution [ηiij , ηjij ] ∼
bivariate normal [0, 0, 1, 1, ρ] is assumed. The model is thus estimated as a bivari-
ate probit with partial observability. In the bivariate probit, two binary response
variables vary jointly; partial observability occurs when a positive outcome is ob-
served only if both response variables are positive. To proceed to the estimation,
the problem is reformulated in the following way. Let’s define
uiij =
{
1 if ϕiij + ηiij ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(1.12)
16This is a slight abuse of notation, since gij should be defined as g + ij if xij = 0 and g − ij if
xij = 1, and analogously gi¯j should be defined as g− ij if xij = 1 and g if xij = 0. In everything that
follows gij and gi¯j will refer to the artificial networks created from g setting a particular link ij to 1 or
to 0 (regardless of the link being 1 or 0 in reality).
17For instance I do not control for formal associations belongings and trade partnerships.
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ujij =
{
1 if ϕjij + ηjij ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(1.13)
Each of these dichotomous variables take value one when the corresponding
agent, given the equilibrium network architecture, benefits from forming the link
ij. What is observed is a binary variable xij which is the product of these variables
for both agent i and agent j:
xij = uiijujij =
{
1 if uiij = 0 & ujij = 0
0 otherwise
(1.14)
Now the problem reduces to a two-equations system where the dependent vari-
ables are uiij and ujij , errors are correlated, the observed outcome is uiijujij and
linear restrictions are imposed such that the individual coefficients α, β and γ in
ϕiij and ϕjij are the same for the two equations. This model is analogous to the
one proposed by Poirier (1980) (see also Maddala, 1983; Abowd and Farber, 1982;
Farber, 1983).
For each dyad ij, benefits from linking are given by the additional utility that
each agent respectively gets if the link ij is formed, compared to the case where
the link is not formed. uiij = 1 if ceteris paribus player i finds it profitable to form
link ij, that is, if
uiij − u¯iij =
 ∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tik)αyk −
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tik)αyk
+ βZij + ηiij ≥ 0 (1.15)
and analogously ujij = 1 if
ujij − u¯jij =
 ∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tjk)αyk −
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tjk)αyk
+ βZij + ηjij ≥ 0 (1.16)
The terms in brackets represent the overall net gain in terms of direct and indirect
partners’ discounted income that agent i and j respectively get if link ij is formed,
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and can be decomposed by geodesic distance:
∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tik)αyk −
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tik)αyk =
αδ(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ai1
yj + αδ(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ai2
[
yk∈N(gij)
δ(tik)=2
− yk∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tik)=2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡2steps gainiij
+αδ(3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ai3
[
yk∈N(gij)
δ(tik)=3
− yk∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tik)=3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡3steps gainiij
+...
(1.17)
and, for the agent j,
∑
k∈N(gij)
δ(tjk)αyk −
∑
k∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tjk)αyk =
αδ(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡aj1
yi + αδ(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡aj2
[
yk∈N(gij)
δ(tjk)=2
− yk∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tjk)=2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡2steps gainjij
+αδ(3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡aj3
[
yk∈N(gij)
δ(tjk)=3
− yk∈N(gi¯j)
δ(tjk)=3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡3steps gainjij
+...
(1.18)
In this way we can explicitly separate the net utility gains deriving from indirect
contacts according to their distance. For instance, 2steps gainiij expresses the net
gain in terms of income of agents 2-steps-away that i gets if the link ij is formed.
This term may be positive or negative18 and can be computed from data. This de-
composition provides a straightforward test of my hypothesis: if the α coefficients
turn out to be significant it suggests that agents form arrangements taking also into
account the relative position and the wealth of indirect partners.
Keeping in mind that wealth is given by yi = (landi, livestocki), and setting
δ(tij) = 0 for tij ≥ 4 for technical reasons19 my final specification is therefore a
bivariate probit with partial observability given by:
18It is negative for instance if agent i sets a link with a partner who used to be reachable in 2 steps,
because the direct gain is reflected in a 2-steps-distance loss.
19First note that the maximum geodesic distance in the network is 5 and therefore the sum of regres-
sors accounting for direct and indirect gains up to the 5th step equals zero. This is rather intuitive: from
i’s point of view, any potential partner j is reachable in a maximum of 5 steps, therefore if the link ij
is formed the asset of j simply gets closer. In other words, any change in the network structure results
in a readjustment of players’ relative position. This is true for all dyads except for three specific cases
(namely, dyads that are connected by a link where one of the partners only has this link, such that in
the alternative scenario the household is not reachable anymore). Also note that, since the network
is rather dense (with an average geodesic distance of 2.5), structural adjustments are ”reabsorbed”
in a few steps; therefore in most cases several-steps-away-gains are null. For instance, the variable
5steps livestock gain equal zero in 6908 out of 7021 observations. Therefore regressors accounting for
direct and indirect gains up to the 4th step are (almost perfectly) collinear, and I omit 4steps land gain
and 4steps livestock gain for i and j taking them as a reference category.
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
ai11 landj + ai122steps land gainiij + ai133steps land gainiij+
ai21 livestockj + ai222steps livestock gainiij+
ai233steps livestock gainiij + βiZij + ηiij ≥ 0
(1.19)

aj11 landi + aj122steps land gainjij + aj133steps land gainjij+
aj21 livestocki + aj222steps livestock gainjij+
aj233steps livestock gainjij + βjZij + ηjij ≥ 0
(1.20)
Where I constrain the coefficients to be the same for Equation 1 and 2:
ai11 = aj11
ai12 = aj12
ai13 = aj13
ai21 = aj21
ai22 = aj22 (1.21)
ai23 = aj23
βi = βj
In order to compute the regressors all shortest paths among all players for all
possible scenarios have been calculated. That is, for each dyad ij, the networks
gij and gi¯j are constructed, a matrix of geodesic distances is assigned to gij and gi¯j
respectively, and finally all tik, tjk, ∀k : k ∈ N(gij) and tik, tjk,∀k : k ∈ N(gi¯j)
are calculated and multiplied for agents’ land and livestock assets. This has been
done with Dikstra’s algorithm, a procedure to solve the single-source shortest path
problem in graphs.20
1.6 Specifications and Results
In this section I first describe the variables in use (as summarized in Table 1.1), I
then present results from the baseline model, and I finally relax the assumption of
symmetric benefits between network partners.
1.6.1 Variable Definition
In all following specifications, the units of observation are the households’ dyads,
and the dichotomous dependent variable equals one if the two households in the
20This algorithm, proposed by Dijkstra (1959), was originally programmed for directed, weighted
graphs. For a given pair of vertices of a graph, the algorithm finds the shortest path.
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dyad are connected with a link of mutual help (see Section 1.4). As the theory
suggests, benefits are given by direct and indirect partners’ wealth while costs of
linking are determined by the social distance between the two households who
form the dyad. The estimates of social distance are based on geographical dis-
tance, kinship levels, clan membership, education, religion, households’ income
sources and covariance in portfolios.
Households’ wealth is bi-dimensional and is given by the monetary value of
land and livestock assets (bulls, cows, calves, goats, sheep, pigs, chickens, and
ducks), in Tanzanian shillings.21
Geographical distance (in meters) is included to account for the fact that fre-
quent interactions between neighbors can broaden their information and facilitate
trust relations.
I record a kinship tie between two households whenever a member of one
household has a blood bond up with a member of the other one, so that each dyad
falls into one of the four categories: ”parents, children and siblings”, ”Nephews,
nieces, uncles, aunts, cousins, grandparents and grandchildren”, ”other blood bo-
nd”, and the default is ”no blood bond”. Clan membership is instead a dummy
taking the value of one is the two households belong to the same clan.
Education may impact link formation through several channels. On the one
hand, it can be a dimension of similarity if households share the same educa-
tional attainments. On the other hand, as De Weerdt (2004) suggests, education
is a scarce and useful resource and households without literate members may find
it interesting to befriend households with literate members. A household is con-
sidered educated if at least one member has completed primary school, and not
educated otherwise. Taking as reference the case of different educational levels,
the two dummies take the value one if both households have an educated member
and take the value of zero if no members are educated.
For what concerns religious belonging, perceived distance between the three
religious groups may not always be the same: since Catholics and Lutheran are
both Christians, they are supposed to be ideologically closer between themselves
than with Muslims. Therefore, taking as reference the case where both households
are Lutheran, dummies for every religious combination are included in order to
capture each group’s willingness to form links within its own religion and with
other religions.
21Data on land were originally in acres, but in order to allow comparisons they have been trans-
formed in monetary equivalent. I use a conversion rate of 300000 tzs for 1 acre, which reflects average
local prices in 2000. For international comparisons, the exchange rate in 2000 was 1 US dollar for 800
tzs.
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Table 1.1: Variables Definition
landj Monetary value of land owned by household j
(1 unit=100000 tzs)
livestockj Monetary value of livestock owned by household j
(1 unit=100000 tzs)
2steps land gain iij Net gain for i in term of land of 2 steps away agents
if link ij is formed (1 unit=100000 tzs)
3steps land gain iij Net gain for i in term of land of 3 steps away agents
if link ij is formed (1 unit=100000 tzs)
2steps livestock gain iij Net gain for i in term of livestock of 2 steps away
agents if link ij is formed (1 unit=100000 tzs)
3steps livestock gain iij Net gain for i in term of livestock of 3 steps away
agents if link ij is formed (1 unit=100000 tzs)
distance(mts) ij Distance between the households’ houses (mts)
strict kinship ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if adults in the two
households are respectively parents, children or sib-
lings
broad kinship ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if adults in the two
households are respectively nephews, nieces, un-
cles, aunts, cousins, grandparents or grandchildren
other blood links ij Dummy variable, equals 1 for blood bonds other
than the ones above
same clan ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if the two households be-
long to the same clan
both Muslim ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if both households are
Muslim
both Catholic ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if both households are
Catholic
Lutheran + Catholic ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if households are
Catholic and Lutheran respectively
Catholic+ Muslim ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if households are
Catholic and Muslim respectively
Lutheran + Muslim ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if households are
Lutheran and Muslim respectively
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Table 1.1: Variables Definition (Continued)
both low education ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if in neither of the
two households a member has completed primary
school
both high education ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if in both households at
least one member has completed primary school
income share from
off-farm j
Share of total income originated from off-farm labor
in household j
income share from
casual labor j
Share of total income originated from casual labor
in household j
income share from
trade j
Share of total income originated from trade in
household j
income share from
cropping j
Share of total income originated from cropping in
household j
income share from
livestock j
Share of total income originated from livestock rear-
ing in household j
income share from
assets j
Share of total income originated from assets in
household j
income share from
processing j
Share of total income originated from processing in
household j
covariance off-farm ij (income share from off-farm)i × (income share from
off-farm)j
covariance casual
labor ij
(income share from casual labor)i × (income share
from casual labor)j
covariance trade ij (income share from trade)i × (income share from
trade)j
covariance cropping ij (income share from cropping)i × (income share
from cropping)j
covariance livestock ij (income share from livestock)i × (income share
from livestock)j
covariance assets ij (income share from assets)i × (income share from
assets)j
covariance
processingij
(income share from processing)i × (income share
from processing) j
difference land ij | landi - landj |
difference livestock ij | livestocki - livestockj |
moreland ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if landi >landj
morelivestock ij Dummy variable, equals 1 if livestocki >livestockj
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The information about productive activities was collected at the individual
level. Each active adult has listed the one or more productive activities he is en-
gaged into, and then these activities were coded in seven categories: casual la-
bor, trade, crops, livestock rearing, assets, processing of agricultural products and
other off-farm work. Here I introduce two sets of regressors to account for differ-
ent mechanisms. On one side income from a particular activity may be considered
more valuable an asset. That is, potential partners’ source of income may also be
relevant and not only the income itself. Therefore, a proxy for the share of total in-
come originated by each productive activity in the partner household is included
among the regressors.22 On the other side, people engaged in similar activities
are facilitated in forming links, thus covariance terms for households’ productive
activities portfolios are also included.23 As several authors have already pointed
out (De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2005), people engaged in similar
activities are also subject to similar income fluctuations, which make insurance ar-
rangements less efficient. However in Nyakatoke the large majority of loans and
gifts take place in the event of idiosyncratic shocks and not community-correlated
events.24 Table 1.1 summarizes the variables’ definition.
1.6.2 The Baseline Model
Column (1) in Table 1.2 refers to the benchmark case where agents only take into
account land and livestock assets for direct partners, and the network structure
is disregarded. Column (2) includes land and livestock gains from the entire net-
work structure according to the model presented in Section 1.5. For both columns,
marginal effects are reported.
Direct partners’ assets landj and livestockj are positive and significant, even
when these traditional variables are the only ones included as in (1). As expected,
the richer a potential partner, the more desirable is a link with him.
2steps livestock gainiij and 3steps livestock gainiij , which represent the net gains
22This term is calculated as follows: in the survey each adult individual mentions the one or more
productive activities he is involved into. Since individuals do not mention the relative importance of
each activity, all activities they mention are assumed to contribute to their income in the same measure.
Therefore, for each household the share of total income generated by each productive activity is calcu-
lated on the base of the number of active members and their activities. In case an individual does not
earn any income, the information is coded as a zero (note that 5 households have no member earning
any income).
23For each dyad and for each productive activity, the product the two households’ income shares is
used as measure of overlapping by sector.
24In the fifth survey round (December 2000) all adults individuals were asked to enumerate the two
worst shocks their household has experienced in the past 10 years. As Dercon and De Weerdt (2006)
report, the respondents listed a total of 296 shocks: illness is the most frequently mentioned shock,
followed by death/funeral, ceremony, and crime and court cases. Community-correlated events (as
bad agricultural prices or weather shocks) are mentioned only 12 times, which supports the hypothesis
of idiosyncratic shocks.
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in term of livestock of 2 and 3-steps-away partners that the agent receives if the
link is formed, are significant and positive in sign. The analogous variables for
land (2steps land gainiij and 3steps land gainiij ) are also significant, and their sign
is negative. That is, agents actually take into account the wealth characteristics
and the relative position of all other individuals in the community when deciding
whether to form a link. However, indirect livestock benefits seem to be favorably
perceived, while for land the opposite holds; Section 1.7 will be devoted to the
interpretation of this evidence. Interestingly, results from (1) appear biased. The
direction of the bias is precisely determined by the fact that network externalities
are omitted, and therefore their effect is absorbed by the direct partners’ coeffi-
cients. That is, when wealth externalities (negative in case of land and positive in
case of livestock) are omitted the coefficient for direct partners’ land is overesti-
mated, while the coefficient for direct partners’ livestock is underestimated.
All other variables have the expected sign, and reconfirm what has been docu-
mented by previous studies on risk sharing networks (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003;
De Weerdt, 2004; Dekker, 2004). Geographical proximity between two households
is significantly correlated with the existence of a link. The same holds for kinship
ties; the stricter the blood tie the stronger the effect. In fact the likelihood of ob-
serving a link is greater when household components are respectively parents and
children than in the case where they are grandparents and grandchildren. On the
other side, clan belonging and educational attainment do not seem to be relevant
for link formation. Looking at religious belonging, Muslim households seem to be
much more willing to form links with people of their same religion than Catholic
and Lutherans respectively, which can be interpreted in the light of their ideolog-
ical distance from the two Christian groups. Also this can result from a minority
effect since Muslims are the smallest of the three religious groups. Additionally,
the likelihood of observing a link between Catholics and Muslims is significantly
smaller than for any other religious combination. Regarding income sources, data
suggest that only assets and processing have significant coefficients, that is, are
considered more valuable for mutual help purposes, while no variable accounting
for income generating activity overlapping seems to strikingly impact the process
of link formation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that major findings are robust to the elimination
of livestock outliers, and also if we control for the impact of family belonging on
wealth.25 These results have been omitted for the sake of brevity but they are avail-
able upon request.
25Since agents may evaluate potential partners’ wealth differently whenever they all belong to the
same family, I re-estimate the model interacting partners’ assets with a dummy same familyij which
equals one whenever there is any blood link between i and j.
22 The Network Structure of Informal Arrangements
Table 1.2: Bivariate Probit Marginal Effects26
Dependent variable: uiij
(1 ) (2 )
landj .0034934 .0020332
(0.000) (0.003)
livestockj .0087746 .0125078
(0.034) (0.000)
2 steps land gainiij -.0012536
(0.000)
3 steps land gainiij -.0004188
(0.058)
2 steps livestock gainiij .0062917
(0.002)
3 steps livestock gainiij .0057006
(0.005)
distance (mts)ij -.000062 -.0000631
(0.000) (0.000)
strict kinshipij .0506058 .2131954
(0.041) (0.002)
broad kinshipij .040352 .0798821
(0.004) (0.001)
other blood linksij .0301029 .0480781
(0.000) (0.001)
same clanij .0014884 .0002623
(0.730) (0.957)
both Muslimij .0205308 .0219675
(0.002) (0.019)
both Catholicij -.0050362 -.0085584
(0.268) (0.071)
Lutheran + Catholicij -.0035143 -.0057569
(0.376) (0.179)
Catholic+Muslimij -.0218936 -.0228431
(0.000) (0.000)
Lutheran + Muslimij -.0050575 -.0069864
(0.277) (0.140)
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Table 1.2: Bivariate Probit Marginal Effects (Continued)
(1 ) (2 )
Catholic+Muslimij -.0218936 -.0228431
(0.000) (0.000)
Lutheran + Muslimij -.0050575 -.0069864
(0.277) (0.140)
both low educationij -.0009396 -.0033343
(0.897) (0.648)
both high educationij .001516 .0041251
(0.624) (0.203)
income share from off-farmj .0199957 .0378192
(0.220) (0.071)
income share from casual laborj .0152096 .0280453
(0.225) (0.122)
income share from tradej -.0128758 .0010232
(0.359) (0.957)
income share from croppingj .0293193 .0271912
(0.086) (0.260)
income share from livestockj .0103609 .0181362
(0.575) (0.427)
income share from assetsj .1065404 .1889668
(0.160) (0.011)
income share from processingj .0598164 .0635219
(0.002) (0.003)
covariance off-farmij .040869 .0317597
(0.305) (0.504)
covariance casual laborij -.0388885 -.0499187
(0.093) (0.083)
covariance tradeij .0060595 .0001152
(0.867) (0.998)
covariance croppingij -.032385 -.0217649
(0.118) (0.388)
covariance livestockij -.1029424 -.1220129
(0.237) (0.229)
covariance assetsij 1758 1925
(0.137) (0.197)
covariance processingij -.0209847 .0065028
(0.617) (0.882)
observations 6670 6670
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
p value in parenthesis
26For landj , livestockj and income shares: means are calculated on the original sample of 119
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1.6.3 A Model with Asymmetric Exchanges
In this subsection I estimate an extended version of the model that allows for het-
erogeneity in the impact of partner’s wealth. That is, now the agents’ utility func-
tion becomes
ui(g) = yi +
∑
j∈N(g)
δ(tij)αyj +
∑
j:ij∈g
[ψ + ξmore yij ] |yi − yj |
∑
j:ij∈g
βZij +
∑
j:ij∈g
γEij
(1.22)
where the dummy more yij equals one whenever yi > yj . This way the overall
effect of partner’s assets may also depend on the absolute difference in wealth
and on the relative position of the two agents. This is motivated by the fact that
in Nyakatoke the links between wealthy and poor agents are frequent and from
the point of view of the rich they cannot be interpreted in terms of economic in-
centives only.27 The specifications in Table 1.3 therefore allow agents to attribute
different weights to economic incentives. Again, (3) reports the results of a model
where agents only care about direct partners’ characteristics and indirect contacts
are omitted, and this is confronted with the full model of (4), which also takes into
account indirect partners’ assets.
As we can see from Table 1.3, results are consistent with the ones obtained from
the less sophisticated model, and all relevant variables behave in the expected
way for sign and significance, including indirect contacts whose relevance is re-
confirmed. Again, direct partners’ assets from (3) appear biased, overestimated
in the case of land and underestimated in the case of livestock. Additionally, it is
worth noticing that allowing for asymmetric economic incentives, the estimated
coefficients for direct partners’ assets landj and livestockj are bigger. Overall, this
confirms that the basic model is able to describe satisfactorily the phenomena, and
its simplicity does affect the major results.
For what concerns the new variables, assets’ differences are as expected signifi-
cantly negative, confirming that the wealth gap is a negative factor for link forma-
tion. Interactionsmorelandij×difference landij andmorelivestockij×difference
households. For 2steps land gainiij , 3steps land gainiij , 2steps livestock gainiij , and
3steps livestock gainiij : means are calculated on all households in the dyads (7021+7021 observa-
tions). All other variables’ means are calculated on the sample of 7021 dyads. Marginal effects for
household i are reported.
27At first glance we could think that these unbalanced links simply come from the definition of the
variable. Since links are assumed to be reciprocal (see Section 1.4), it might be argued that poor partners
always declare links with rich ones, and therefore these links are not really reciprocal as it is assumed.
However this is not the case since when the link is not reciprocal, the partner who declares the link
is indeed more often the poorer out of the two, but the difference is not as striking as we could have
expected (see Appendix A, Table 11). Moreover, in the survey individuals could list as many contacts
as they want and, since on average wealthy people also have more links, they are likely to quote only
the most important ones. Therefore this difference alone cannot explain why we observe so many
unbalanced links in terms of wealth.
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Table 1.3: Marginal Effects under Asymmetry
Dependent variable: uiij
(3) (4)
landj .0076215 .0047065
(0.001) (0.003)
livestockj .0317126 .0367085
(0.004) (0.001)
2steps land gainiij -.0015526
( 0.000)
3steps land gainiij -.000613
(0.048)
2steps livestock gainiij .0078039
(0.007)
3steps livestock gainiij .0068213
(0.017)
difference landij -.0079918 -.006384
(0.000) (0.000)
morelandij×difference landij .0111502 .009408
(0.000) (0.000)
difference livestockij -.0274673 -.0232054
(0.015) (0.036)
morelivestockij×difference
livestockij
.0287672 .0233399
(0.013) (0.045)
distance (mts)ij -.0001138 -.0000885
(0.000) (0.000)
strict kinshipij .4874882 .4238081
(0.000) ( 0.001)
broad kinshipij .1946591 .1486708
(0.007) (0.012)
other blood linksij .1090885 .0845001
(0.006) (0.009)
same clanij .0025018 .0005
(0.776) (0.944)
both Muslimij .0561747 .0381908
(0.028) (0.028)
both Catholicij -.0114761 -.0107467
(0.171) (0.105)
Lutheran+Catholicij -.0087999 -.0078651
(0.252) (0.201)
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Table 1.3: Marginal Effects under Asymmetry (Continued)
Catholic+Muslimij -.0357431 -.0301752
(0.000) (0.000)
Lutheran+Muslimij -.0097081 -.0090277
(0.251) (0.182)
both low educationij -.0039103 -.0020934
(0.765) (0.843)
both high educationij .0039548 .0030891
(0.500) (0.512)
income share from off-farmj .0581153 .0640093
(0.022) (0.014)
income share from casual laborj .0455959 .0452254
(0.033) (0.029)
income share from tradej -.027862 -.0180362
(0.240) (0.429)
income share from croppingj .0357799 .0300155
(0.129) (0.231)
income share from livestockj .0329305 .0254715
(0.251) (0.343)
income share from assetsj .2327595 .2172934
(0.007) (0.011)
income share from processingj .0610097 .0811598
(0.018) (0.003)
covariance off-farmij .034764 .0098725
(0.661) (0.883)
covariance casual laborij -.1088319 -.0900709
(0.020) ( 0.019 )
covariance tradeij .0042729 .0215645
(0.952) (0.705)
covariance croppingij -.0401871 -.0253034
(0.180) (0.383)
covariance livestockij -.226248 -.1940877
(0.178) (0.183)
covariance assetsij 3885347 3083
(0.130) (0.178)
covariance processingij .0900104 .0392718
(0.230) (0.516)
observations 6670 6670
dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
p value in parenthesis
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livestockij are both significant and positive, that is, the richest the agent the
less concerned about partner’s assets. This suggests that rich individuals may
have non-economic motivations to form links, which is in line with the theory of
asymmetric exchanges. In asymmetric exchanges, income is traded against sym-
bolic attributes such as homage, respect, social esteem or political power. Several
previous economists have indeed interpreted gift transactions as exchange rather
than altruism, and have recognized asymmetric exchanges as the base of village-
level patronage relationships in developing countries (Breman, 1974; Scott, 1976;
Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 1995).
1.7 An Interpretation of the Results
The results on direct contacts presented in Section 1.6 suggest that, in line with
intuition, the richer a potential partner, the higher the willingness to form a link
with him. On the other hand, the results on indirect contacts for land and livestock
differ in sign, that is, coefficients for livestock are positive, while for land the di-
rection of the effect is the opposite. An interpretation of these findings based on
anthropological and distributional considerations is proposed in what follows.
Land is the traditional status symbol in Haya society and the primary asset for
most households in Nyakatoke. As Mitti Rweyamamu (2001) remark, ”Almost ev-
ery family in Nyakatoke owns the land it lives on and cultivates”. On the other hand,
almost all livestock is in the hands of a few households, while 38% of the popula-
tion owns no livestock at all. These features result in a Gini coefficient for livestock
that is almost twice the one for land (0.79 vs. 0.44). For the distributions of assets
by quintile I remand to the Appendix A, Table 4.A.
Land and livestock for the same household are not necessarily correlated, but it
may be the case that a household is in the 1st quintile for an asset and in the 5th
quintile for the other. However, some features of the top quintile are common to
both land and livestock distributions. Households in the 5th quintile have more
links than the rest of the population and are relatively more connected among
themselves than with less wealthy income groups (see Appendix A, Table 5.A and
6.A for links by quintile and Table 7.A for outliers in the number of links). If we
consider instead the very upper part of the distribution (95th centile), the behavior
of land and livestock owners differs. Landowners in the 95th centile have an aver-
age number of links that is close to the sample mean, while livestock owners in the
95th centile have more than twice the average number of contacts (see Appendix
A, Table 8.A). Also, if we abstract from the number of links and only consider how
these links are distributed across wealth groups, we notice that the 95th centile for
livestock has a much stronger tendency to link with other wealthy individuals in
terms of livestock (See Appendix A, Table 9.A). Therefore not only are the out-
liers in terms of livestock very few and also hubs for their number of contacts, but
they are also strictly interconnected among themselves (in fact among them the
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network is complete, that is, all possible links exist). A justification of this strict
interconnection comes from the consuetudinary rules of Nyakatoke, where ”[. . . ]
indigenous cattle are grazed in a common herd (buyo). Cattle from several households are
pooled each day and herded in turn” (Mitti and Rweyamamu, 2001).
As network theory acknowledges from its very first steps (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996) externalities from indirect contacts may be positive or negative. That is,
the friends of my friends can be beneficial in that they broaden my range of so-
cial interactions, but they can also be detrimental if there is competition because
the social and/or economic resources of direct friends are scarce. This seems to be
the case for Nyakatoke, where both forces are present and drive results in oppo-
site directions. In mutual support arrangements, friends’ friends may indeed be
beneficial in terms of social status or in that small gifts in nature can be expected
from them in case of need. However, they may also be detrimental since most
households in Nyakatoke live at the subsistence level (with an average food share
on consumption of 77%) and not much is left to help people in need, and there-
fore a partner with several contacts is not very likely to be a big support in case
of necessity. In the case of land, externalities from indirect contacts are negative.
In other words, Nyakatoke villagers prefer rich partners, but with fewer and/or
poorer contacts. Since the distribution of land is relatively egalitarian, it can be
generalized as a condition on the number of contacts: the fewer additional friends
other than myself my partner has, the more valuable he is ceteris paribus. For
land assets the competition mechanism prevails because the benefits that can be
extracted from friends are connected to the use of their land, and therefore exclu-
sive by their own nature. As descriptive evidence about Nyakatoke points out,
”free gift of land for cultivation of seasonal crops among friends and neighbours is quite
common. A little of the produce may be given to the landowner as a gesture of appreciation
for the use of his land”, and also ”some villagers (especially women) perform vigodi [a
term used in the locality to mean casual labor, especially farm work] or working on
other households farms for cash” (Mitti and Rweyamamu, 2001). The vast majority
of households can devote a small portion of their land assets to help partners in
time of need, which exacerbates the competition for these scarce resources. This,
as is explained in what follows, is not the case for livestock. In Nyakatoke a large
stock of livestock is in the hands of a really few households. Livestock is therefore
a real wealth dimension, more valuable than land in that it is less subject to eco-
nomic fluctuations than agricultural harvests, which is reflected by the magnitude
of the coefficients (see Table 1.2 and Appendix A, Table 5.A), where in terms of risk
sharing a unit of livestock is considered more valuable than an analogous mon-
etary unit of land. In the case of livestock indirect contacts are positive in sign:
good partners bring many and/or rich indirect contacts and, given the distribu-
tion, ”rich” is the natural interpretation. Here the positive externality prevails on
the competition mechanism for several reasons. First, a relation based on livestock
exchanges is by nature less exclusive than a relation based on the temporary use of
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land. Second, small gifts in nature (for example a chicken for a funeral party) are
very common practice in Nyakatoke, and the likelihood of receiving some kind of
indirect support via a partner who has rich contacts instead of many contacts is
higher. Third, the few rich livestock owners are wealthy enough to support sev-
eral people in need at the same time, which decreases competition for resources,
and they are really interconnected among themselves, which facilitates the exter-
nality flow. These considerations altogether explain why in the case of land the
competition may reasonably dominate, while for livestock the positive externality
of indirect contacts prevails as results in Section 1.6 suggest.
1.8 Conclusions
This chapter approaches mutual support arrangements in rural villages from a net-
work perspective, investigating how links are formed and whether indirect con-
tacts are relevant in the process of network formation. When agents form a link
not only do they establish a new contact, but they also gain access to the larger
network of the partner’s friends and friends of these friends. In this chapter I test
the hypothesis that indirect contacts matter, that is, when forming links agents also
consider the wealth and the relative position of indirect partners. A network for-
mation model with full heterogeneity among agents is first presented following
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); an estimation protocol is then proposed and applied
to data on a village in rural Tanzania. Results show that agents actually take into
account the net advantage of potential links, evaluating also indirect benefits de-
riving from changes in their position with respect to all other agents. This chap-
ter contributes to both network theory and the empirical literature on informal
economic arrangements, in that it proposes an innovative procedure to estimate
endogenous network formation models, and also provides evidence that indirect
contacts have an explanatory value disregarded by all previous studies, which are
focused on direct relations only.
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1.9 Appendix A
Figure 1.A: Links among Nyakatoke Households
Figure 2.A: Land Quantiles
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Figure 3.A: Livestock Quantiles
Table 1.A: Nyakatoke Age Structure
Age category Male Female Total
younger than 10 93 104 197
10 to 20 75 74 149
20 to 30 38 50 88
30 to 40 29 29 58
40 to 50 22 23 45
50 to 60 14 14 28
60 to 70 9 7 16
70 to 80 3 8 11
older than 80 3 5 8
TOTAL 286 314 600
Source: De Weerdt (2004)
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Table 2.A: Distribution of Dyadic Variables
Variable Definition Dyads (tot. 7021)
Link No link 6531
Unilateral or reciprocal link 490
Geodesic distance 1 step 490
2 steps 1996
3 steps 2900
4 steps 1275
5 steps 360
Kinship Child, siblings, parents 109
Nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, cousins,
grandparents, grandchildren
102
Other blood links 172
No blood link 6638
Education Both households have at least one
member who completed primary edu-
cation
4278
Only one household has at least one
member who completed primary edu-
cation
2418
None of the two households have any
member who completed primary edu-
cation
325
Table 3.A: Distribution of Attribute Variables among Households
Religion Muslim 24 n=119
Lutheran 46
Catholic 49
Clan 1 household 11 n=119
2 households 5
3 households 2
4 to 10 households 5
12 to 23 households 3
Households engaged in Casual labor 57 n=116
Trade 41
Crops 108
Livestock 31
Assets 8
Processing 45
Other off-farm 40
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Table 4.A.1: Land Assets by Quintile
Quintile Average land(ha)
Quintile 1 0.29
Quintile 2 0.62
Quintile 3 0.98
Quintile 4 1.43
Quintile 5 3.37
Table 4.A.2: Livestock Assets by Quintile28
Quintile n. of households Average livestock (tzs)
No livestock 42 0
Quintile 1 16 3000
Quintile 2 16 9512.5
Quintile 3 14 19042.9
Quintile 4 16 38012.5
Quintile 5 15 353613.3
Table 5.A.1: Links by Land Quintile, Absolute Values
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5
Quintile1 11 24 27 26 29
Quintile2 24 16 47 42 40
Quintile3 27 47 21 35 51
Quintile4 26 42 35 21 56
Quintile5 29 40 51 56 44
28Households with no livestock are considered a group on its own, and livestock quintiles are based
only on the share of population that actually owns livestock.
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Table 5.A.2: Links by Land Quintile, Percentages
Q. 1 Q. 2 Q. 3 Q. 4 Q. 5 Total
Quintile1 9 21 23 22 25 100
Quintile2 14 9 28 25 24 100
Quintile3 15 26 12 19 28 100
Quintile4 14 23 19 12 31 100
Quintile5 13 18 23 25 20 100
Table 6.A.1: Links by Livestock Quintile, Absolute Values
No livestock Q. 1 Q. 2 Q. 3 Q. 4 Q. 5
No livestock 46 27 32 49 41 41
Quintile1 27 6 10 26 10 14
Quintile2 32 10 11 25 18 18
Quintile3 49 26 25 17 25 18
Quintile4 41 10 18 25 7 28
uintile5 41 14 18 18 28 21
Table 6.A.2: Links by Livestock Quintile, Percentage
No livestock Q. 1 Q. 2 Q. 3 Q. 4 Q. 5 Total
No livestock 19 11 14 21 17 17 100
Quintile1 29 6 11 28 11 15 100
Quintile2 28 9 10 22 16 16 100
Quintile3 31 16 16 11 16 11 100
Quintile4 32 8 14 19 5 22 100
Quintile5 29 10 13 13 20 15 100
Table 7.A: The Most Connected Households in Nyakatoke
(95th Centile for Number of Links, 6 obs.)
Number of Links Quintile land Quintile livestock
20 2 2
22 5 4
23 5 5
24 5 5
24 5 5
32 3 2
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Table 8.A: Average Number of Links by Centile
n. observations average links
full sample 119 8.2
Land Quintile 1 24 5.3
Quintile 2 24 7.7
Quintile 3 24 8.4
Quintile 4 23 8.3
Quintile 5 24 11.4
90th centile 12 12.3
95th centile 6 10.2
Livestock No livestock 42 6.7
Quintile 1 16 7.1
Quintile 2 16 10.2
Quintile 3 14 8.9
Quintile 4 16 8.5
Quintile 5 15 10.7
90th centile 7 15.1
95th centile 3 19.3
Table 9.A: Links from the 95 Centile towards the Other Quintiles.
Asset Centile
Contribution of this cen-
tile to the total popula-
tion
Percentage of links from
the 95 centile towards
this centile
land Quintile 1 20 15.3
Quintile 2 20 16.9
Quintile 3 20 20.3
Quintile 4 20 22
Quintile 5 20 25
livestock No livestock 35 21.8
Quintile 1 13 7.30
Quintile 2 13 10.9
Quintile 3 13 12.7
Quintile 4 13 20
Quintile 5 13 27
Table 10.A.1: Links and Kin Group by Land Quintiles
quintile % of links outside % of links
the kin group within the kin group
Quintile 1 70.9 29.1
Quintile 2 69.8 30.2
Quintile 3 68 32
Quintile 4 69.4 30.6
Quintile 5 75.9 24.1
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Table 10.A.2: Links and Kin Group by Livestock Quintiles29
quintile % of links outside % of links
the kin group within the kin group
No livestock 72.9 27.1
Quintile 1 72 28
Quintile 2 60.5 39.5
Quintile 3 73.1 26.9
Quintile 4 67.4 32.6
Quintile 5 75 25
Table 11.A: Wealth in Non-reciprocal Links (% cases)
Land The poorer declares the link 56.57
The richer declares the link 43.43
Livestock The poorer declares the link 52.57
The richer declares the link 36.86
They both have same livestock 9.35
They both have no livestock 1.22
29Kinship groups include all blood links (broad kinship, strict kinship and other blood links).
Chapter 2
Educational Programs in Rural
Nepal: Peer Communication
and Information Spillovers
2.1 Introduction
Although interpersonal communication is universally seen as a powerful multi-
purpose social resource, its economic effects have not yet been quantified. In the
attempt to fill the hole, this chapter studies how individuals exchange information
with peers, how this information circulates and spreads through informal chan-
nels, and how it impacts individual behavior.
I focus on three Nepalese villages where an educational radio program about
family planning and modern contraception methods (FPC henceforth) is weekly
broadcasted. Women in the villages listen to the radio program and discuss FPC
issues with friends of the same gender, so that the information about the new tech-
niques is available to them either through personal exposure or through their net-
work of contacts. I focus on the role of the community as a bridge for information
flow and study how information is spread among peers, with the goal of estimat-
ing the magnitude of information spillovers. When a woman discusses FPC issues
with her friends she also indirectly accesses the information held by other women
than her direct friends. That is, as information circulates throughout the commu-
nity two women who are not directly connected but have a friend in common are
likely to end up exchanging the information that becomes eventually available to
one of them. I claim and empirically demonstrate that not only direct exposure to
the radio program, but also this indirect information component, that I call infor-
mation spillovers, explains woman behavior, and in particular their adoption of
modern FPC methods.
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My study relates to the literature on peer effects, where several empirical stud-
ies have attempted to measure the extent to which individual behavior is influ-
enced by one’s social environment (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Gavi-
ria and Raphael, 2001; Duflo and Saez, 2006). In the majority of cases detailed in-
formation is not available, and thus the reference group is defined on the basis of
personal characteristics, for example all individuals in the same geographical area
or in the same high school dorm (Aizer and Curries, 2002; Sacerdote, 2001; Con-
ley and Topa, forthcoming). While data allow determining the precise structure
of the network, the reference group is defined as the circle of self-reported peers
(Udry and Conley, 2005), and this is also the case for this chapter. However, all
these studies only take into account the characteristics of direct friends, and doing
so they disregard the so-called network effect: in my setting for instance, even if
women exchange information with their direct friends only, there is still an indirect
diffusion of information at the community level that I attempt to quantify.
My analysis is different from all previous peer effect studies in that I explic-
itly take into account the structure of the community network. The educational
radio drama conveys information about modern FPC techniques, and I estimate
how women’s likelihood of adopting modern contraception methods depends on
the fact that they have been exposed to the FPC program allowing for different
levels of exposure. In my setting, a woman is considered directly exposed to infor-
mation if she declared she has personally listened to the FPC radio drama. The
second level of exposure relates to the circle of friends she is in direct contact to.
A woman’s peer exposure is calculated as the number of her direct friends who de-
clare that they have listened to the FPC radio drama. The third level of exposure
to the radio drama is the indirect exposure: since direct links are bridges for infor-
mation flows, the information held by women who are not direct peers can still
be received through friends. I thus draw the complete map of the communication
between women in the village, in order to compute the relative distance between
women in the community network. If two women are not directly connected but
have a friend in common, they are considered two steps apart. A woman’s indirect
exposure is calculated as the number of women who are not among her communi-
cation partners but are two steps apart from her and declare that they have listened
to the FPC radio drama. The specifications that I bring to data incorporate these
three levels of exposure, encompassing the standard models of peer effect.
My empirical analysis is articulated in two parts. In the first part I investigate
whether and to which extent the adoption of modern contraception methods de-
pend on the three levels of exposure as defined above. Results confirm that not
only direct and peer exposure but also indirect exposure has an impact on individ-
ual behavior. In the second part of my analysis, I address the problem of the po-
tential endogeneity of the network. One can in fact argue that two women discuss
FPC issues because they have a priori the same opinion. If this was the case, this
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so-called assortative matching among discussion partners would lead to an over-
estimation of previous results. In order to convince on the contrary, I run a dyadic
analysis that explores the determinants of link formation and, using an instrumen-
tal variable approach, I show that women get together to discuss FPC issues on the
basis of individual and social characteristics other than their ex ante opinion. This
rules out the endogeneity of network links and reconfirms the validity of previous
findings.
While traditional peer-effect literature evaluates the impact of direct partner
characteristics only, I take a wider approach and evaluate how individual behav-
ior is affected by actions undertaken by all other agents in the community. In order
to do that I do not simply incorporate variables which may proxy for information
spillovers at the community level, but I explicitly take into account the structure of
the network emerging from women’s communication patterns. This is in line with
the main lesson on network theory (from Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, onwards)
that stresses the importance not only of direct partners, but also of the entire struc-
ture of the network in affecting individual behavior.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains a review of the rele-
vant literature, while in Section 2.3 the data are presented. The empirical strategy
is presented in Section 2.4 and 2.5: Section 2.4 investigates whether the adoption
of modern contraception methods depend on the exposure to the FPC program,
while Section 2.5 is aimed to rule out the endogeneity of network links. Section 2.6
concludes summarizing the main findings. Tables and figures are presented in the
Appendix B at the end of the chapter.
2.2 Literature Review
My study is at the crossroad of three literatures: the literature on natural experi-
ments, the literature on peer effect, and the economic theory of networks. Natural
experiments and treatment evaluation techniques have been extensively applied to
different fields, from schooling (Krueger, 1999; Evans and Schwab, 1995) to income
smoothing behavior (Grueber, 1996) passing through a wide range of applications
(see Meyer, 1995, for an overview). Natural experiments are particularly useful in
development economics, where household-level program evaluations have been
flourishing in recent years (Duflo, 2001; Duflo, 2003; Kremer, 2003; Kremer and
Miguel, 2004; Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin and Zitzewith, 2004; Angrist, Bettinger
and Kremer, forthcoming). Although natural experiments and peer effect litera-
ture do not generally coincide, they are somehow complementary and in some case
overlap. In the last two decades several studies on peer effects have attempted to
measure the extent to which individual behavior is influenced by one’s social en-
vironment, mainly for what concerns education (Evans, Oates and Schwab, 1992;
Sacerdote, 2001; Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Zimmermann, 2003; Angrist and Lang,
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2004) but also in other fields (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Duflo and
Saez, 2006). The majority of these studies take a linear-in-means approach, that is,
they assume that the individual behavior is a linear function of the mean behavior
of the reference group. In most cases detailed information about social interactions
is not available, and thus the reference group is defined on the base of personal
characteristics, for example all individuals in the same geographical area (Aizer
and Curries, 2002; Conley and Topa, forthcoming) or in the same school grade
or high school dorm (Sacerdote, 2001). When instead data allow determining the
precise structure of the network, the reference group is defined as the circle of self-
reported peers (Udry and Conley, 2005). My study adopts this latter approach,
since I construct the social network directly from the self-reported declarations of
respondents.
The present chapter refers to both natural experiment and peer effect literature,
in that I study the effect of the direct exposure to an educational FPC program and
the peer transmission of the information that the program conveys. Two former
studies have dealt with the same topic: Rogers et al. (1999) and Boulay (2002)
evaluate the effect of a FPC educational radio program in Tanzania and Nepal re-
spectively. However, my approach differs from both of them. Rogers et al. (1999)
concentrate on the direct exposure to the radio program, without taking into ac-
count peer effects and indirect transmission of information. Boulay (2002) uses the
same dataset I use, and starts from an analogous research question since he evalu-
ates how women’s contraception adoption is affected not only by direct exposure
to the FPC program but also by their group of peers. However, he proxies the peer
effect with the share of women’s discussion partners who declare to have listened
to the FPC radio program. In this chapter I instead depart from the theory of net-
works and propose an innovative procedure to calculate peer effects.
The literature on economic networks has been flourishing in the last decade
(Jackson, 2003; Jackson, 2005). From the path-breaking contribution of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) and onwards, network theory, based on game theoretical rea-
soning, claims that not only direct contacts, but also the entire graph of indirect
contacts matter. In the most simple network game setting, the players are agents
who form link among them. Links provide benefits, involve costs, and are created
by mutual agreements. A typical feature of network games is that the utility of
each individual not only depends on actions undertaken by his direct partners,
but also on actions undertaken by all other agents. While the theoretical contri-
butions in the field are numerous, the studies on applied networks are few. The
quasi-totality of them does not study the mechanisms through which individuals
form links, but they rather take agents’ relative position as given to assess the role
of the network structure of the community as determinant of the social outcome
(Calvo`-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2005; Conley and Topa, 2002; Udry and
Conley, 2005). My study incorporates this network approach into the peer effect
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estimation. I claim that since information spills over the community, women’s
adoption of modern contraception methods not only depend on the information
held by their direct partners, but also on the information held by all other women
in the community. This leads to the estimation procedure presented in Section 2.4.
2.3 The Nepal Social Network Survey
In 1991 a national survey carried on by the Nepalese Ministry of Health revealed
a high unmet need of information and services about modern contraception and
family planning. At that time, more than 28% of married women of reproduc-
tive age claimed that they want to delay or limit childbirth but they were not
using contraception. This lack of contraception use was due to various factors,
among them poor information about the effects of contraception, traditional social
norms and culturally defined gender roles limiting women’s decisional power. In
1993, research conducted by the Nepalese Ministry of Health suggested that, due
to the nature of the country’s terrain, radio was the most effective way to reach
the Nepalese population to improve their family planning service use. In order
to fulfil this unmet need of information, in 1995 the Nepalese Ministry of Health,
with technical assistance from The Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore, started
broadcasting a radio drama serial at the national level called Cut your Coat accord-
ing to your Cloth. The drama was designed to educate and entertain at the same
time, and was organized in weekly episodes where residents of fictional villages
model communication regarding FPC and its beneficial effects. The series was
broadcasted once a week in the Nepali language, in three phases: the first phase
went on air from December 1995 to December 1996, the second from December
1997 to December 1998, and the third from January 1999 onwards. The scrupulous
evaluations that have followed the project suggest a high exposure rate and a sig-
nificant effect of the program on the population. In particular, women exposed to
the FPC campaign after the exposure ameliorated their attitude towards FPC, ini-
tiated spousal communication regarding FPC issues, and adopted modern family
planning techniques. For further details I remand to Storey and Boulay (2001).
In this chapter I use data from the Nepal Social Network Survey collected by
the Population Communication Service of Johns Hopkins University. This sur-
vey refers to three villages named Gobardia, Tulsipur and Urahari located in the
mid western district of Dang, which have been reached by the FPC radio cam-
paign. Data were collected in two rounds: a baseline round in November 1997 and
a follow-up survey in March 1999. In this chapter I mainly use the information
from the 1999 follow-up round. In the Nepal Social Network Survey all married
women aged 15-45 were interviewed. The survey provides information on per-
sonal characteristics, contraception habits and exposure to the FPC radio drama.
Women were asked whether they had listened to the FPC radio drama in the past
six months. This allows me to identify which women were treated, that is, reached
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by the educational program. Additionally, the survey contains detailed informa-
tion on interpersonal communication among women. Respondents were asked to
name all women living in the same village with whom they had discussed FPC
issues during the past six months. The identity of discussion partners was then
traced and linked with their identity in the survey to produce a complete map of
the village communication.
Each woman could mention up to 5 discussion partners, and overall 376 dis-
cussion partners were mentioned in the baseline round, and 420 in the follow-
up round. A few mentioned partners (14% in the follow-up round) could not be
matched to a survey respondent because they were living outside of the village, or
they were living in the village but were ineligible for the survey due to their age,
and therefore they have been dropped.
2.4 Evaluating the Transmission of Information
This section is devoted to clarify whether personal links are an effective bridge
for information flows. In order to do that, I investigate whether, apart from direct
exposure and peer exposure to the FPC radio drama, information spillovers from
indirect exposure has an impact on individual contraception adoption.
2.4.1 Direct, Peer Level and Indirect Exposure
In the 1999 follow-up round of the Nepal Social Network Survey, respondents were
asked to ”list the full names of those women in your village with whom you have discussed
family planning in the last six months”. This piece of information is used to define
whether a link exists and to trace the network architecture for each of the three
villages. The links are assumed to be reciprocal for two reasons: first, given the
high specificity of the question posed to respondents, and given that interaction
among women in the village is frequent and complex, women are more likely to
forget about having discussed FPC issues with one of their friends rather than
misreporting to have had discussions if this was not the case. Second, women
could mention no more than 5 partners, therefore some well-connected women
may have been forced to mention only their principal discussion partners rather
than all of them. I thus assume links to be unweighted and undirected, and every
time a woman mentions another one I draft a communication link between them.1
With this procedure 310 links among the 337 women are identified overall. The
resulting network is rather sparse, with 71 isolated women out of 337, an average
1The complete analysis has been also repeated under a stricter definition of network, where women
are considered connected if each of them mentions the other as a FPC discussion partner. Results are
similar in sign and magnitude but a few variables lose their significance, which is not surprising since
under this definition the 310 links among 337 women reduce to 51 links only.
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number of links equal to 1.8. The geodesic distance (that is, the number of steps in
the shortest path between two women) has a mean value of 4.45 and a maximum
value of 11 steps. For a graphical representation of the three villages’ networks see
Figure 1.B, Appendix B.
Once I have drawn the complete map of the communication networks in the
three villages, I estimate how the likelihood of adopting modern contraception
methods depends on the fact that the woman has been reached by the FPC radio
drama directly and/or indirectly. Women in the sample are classified as contra-
ception users if they reported using one of the following methods: oral contracep-
tives, IUDs, injectable methods, condoms, Norplant, female sterilization, or male
sterilization. I concentrate my analysis on the six months period of time prior to
the follow-up survey (October 1998-March 1999). I select the 151 women who at
the beginning of the six months period were not pregnant and were not using a
modern contraception method. Out of them, 129 were still not using a modern
contraception method at the end of the six months period, while another 22 had
adopted one by the end of the period.2 In the empirical analysis, the sample will
be reduced to 107 women still not using any contraceptive method and 20 women
who adopted one in the six months prior to the survey, and this due to missing
data.
I allow for three levels of exposure: a woman i is considered directly exposed
to FPC information if she declared to have listened to the FPC radio drama in
the reference period (October 1998-March 1999). In this case, the dummy variable
direct exposurei equals one.
The second level of exposure relates to the group of peers, that is, the women in
the village with whom i has a direct link (either because she declares to have dis-
cussed FPC issues with them or because they declare so). The variable peer exposu-
rei is equal to the number of i’s peers who self-report to have listened to the FPC
radio drama in the six months prior to the survey (October 1998-March 1999). Since
I am interested in the mechanism of information transmission, I use the fact that
these friends have listened to the radio educational program rather than the fact
that they use modern FPC methods themselves.
2All the information is recovered from the 1999 follow-up round in the following way: the women
who did not adopt modern contraception are the ones who in the survey have declared that they have
never used any contraception method. The women who have adopted modern contraception are the
ones who in the survey declare that they have been using a modern contraception method for less than
six months. One can criticize that a woman may have used a different contraception method in the past,
and then switched to the current one, and this is still considered a contraception adoption. If this was
the case it would still be compatible with the idea that exposure to FPC radio drama can help women
to choose a better contraception method, which is grossomodo the effect to be isolated. However this
seems not to be the case, since 20 women out of 22 have never used any method other than the one they
have recently adopted.
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The third level of exposure to the FPC radio drama is the indirect exposure ac-
counting for community-level information spillovers, and refers to women with
whom there is no direct communication. In order to define the concept of indirect
exposure I take the women in the village who are not directly linked to a generic
woman i, but are two steps away from her in that they are directly connected to
one of her peers. Accordingly, the variable indirect exposurei corresponds to the
number of women who have listened to the FPC radio drama in the six months
prior to the survey out of all the women who are two steps away from i.
Even though it would be interesting to also estimate the effect of indirect expo-
sure from women who are three or more steps away in terms on network distance,
these variables are highly correlated with the other variables in use, and therefore
are omitted.3
2.4.2 Basic Specifications and Results
I apply a probit model where the dichotomous dependent variable yi equals one
if the respondent had adopted a modern contraceptive method in the six months
prior to the 1999 follow-up survey. Formally, for a generic woman i let us define
the dummy TREATi which equals one if i has listened to the FPC radio drama
in the reference period. Thus for a set of covariates xi, and defining the so-called
geodesic distance tij as the number of links in the shortest path between i and j,4
we obtain the following equations:
yi = βxi + δ0 TREATi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡direct exposurei
+i (2.1)
yi = βxi + δ0 TREATi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡direct exposurei
+δ1
∑
i6=j
tij=1
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡peer exposurei
+i (2.2)
yi = βxi + δ0 TREATi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡direct exposurei
+δ1
∑
i6=j
tij=1
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡peer exposurei
+δ2
∑
i6=j
tij=2
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡indirectexposurei
+i(2.3)
These three equations correspond to the three columns of Table 2.1. Equation
(2.1) corresponds to column (1) in the Table 2.1 and represents the traditional strat-
egy of program evaluation, where the individual outcome depends on whether the
individual himself was reached by the educational program. The second equation
(2.2) corresponds to column (2) in the Table 2.1 and can be seen as a case of peer-
effect estimation, where self-reported information about the social relationships
are used to construct the community network. Finally, equation (2.3) corresponds
3Let us define 3steps indirect exposurei and 4steps indirect exposurei as the number of women
who have listened to the FPC radio program and are respectively 3 or 4 steps away from i. In the
selected sample, the correlation between indirect exposurei and 3steps indirect exposurei is 0.72,
and the correlation between 3steps indirect exposurei and 4steps indirect exposurei is 0.86.
4By definition the geodesic distance is equal to∞ if there is no path between i and j, which is by
default the case if the two women do not belong to the same village.
2.4 EVALUATING THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION 45
to column (3) in the Table 2.1 and incorporates not only direct exposure and peer
exposure, but also a variable for indirect exposure defined as in the previous sub-
section.
For what concerns the covariates, in Table 2.1 I include women’s socio-economic
characteristics and maternal background. Socio economic characteristics are: the
age (coded with two dummies for 18-25 and 26-35 years respectively, while 36-45
years is omitted), the village (dummies for Tulsipur and Urahari, while Gobardia is
omitted), the caste (coded with two dummies: Tharu, and Brahmins and Chhetris5
while Others is omitted), and monthly household expenditure6 (in quintiles). The
education is expressed by a dummy that equals one if the woman has at least one
year of schooling. The controls related to the maternal story of the respondent are:
the number of previous pregnancies, and a variable called desired childreni cor-
responding to the number of sons and daughters she still should give birth to in
order to reach the number she consider the ideal one, if not reached yet.7 Descrip-
tive statistics for all the variables are reported in the Appendix B, Table 1.B (the
table also report the t-test for ex ante differences between the women who adopted
FPC methods at the end of the period and the one who did not). The estimation
results are reported in Table 2.1 (also, marginal effects for the most complete spec-
ification in column (3) can be found in Appendix B, Table 2.B).
These results confirm that not only direct and peer exposure, but also indirect
exposure to the FPC radio program effect women’s behavior. The direct exposure
to the program is always positive and significant, even when we introduce the
other levels of exposure. Also the coefficients for peer exposure are positively sig-
nificant in both (2) and (3), and similar in magnitude to the direct exposure ones.8
For what concerns the indirect exposure, the magnitude of its effect in smaller
but still positive and significant, which is consistent with the idea of community
spillovers in the diffusion of information. The interpretation is straightforward:
if we define i as the average respondent, one additional woman two-steps-away
from i who has listened to the FPC radio drama increases i’s likelihood of adopt-
ing a modern contraception method by the corresponding marginal effect. This
evidence suggests that the three effects are complementary, and all contribute to
determine the individual behavior.
5Brahmins and Chhetris are considered to have similar cultural systems and therefore they are
grouped in a single category (See Boulay et al., 2002).
6Women who reported not knowing their monthly expenditure were coded at the midpoint of the
distribution.
7Respondents were asked ”if you could choose exactly the number of sons and daughters to have in your
whole life, how many would that be?”. Women answered separately for boys and girls. For each gender
I calculated the difference between the ideal number of children and the number of children born and
currently alive; if this difference is negative I set it to zero. The final variable is the sum of the two
differences calculated by gender.
8The magnitude is likely to depend on the endogeneity of direct exposure (see subsection 2.4.3).
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Table 2.1: Estimated Probit Coefficients, Basic Specifications
Dependent variable: FPC adoption
(1) (2) (3)
direct exposure 0.341 0.644 0.522
(0.008)** (0.000)** (0.016)*
peer exposure 0.722 0.647
(0.000)** (0.000)**
indirect exposure 0.157
(0.024)*
18-25 1273 0.951 0.916
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)**
26-35 1118 0.798 0.760
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
village Tulsipur 1182 2202 2325
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
village Urahari 1375 2479 2572
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Brahmins or Chhetris -0.488 -0.916 -0.930
(0.424) (0.068) (0.095)
Tharu -0.359 -0.804 -0.935
(0.572) (0.120) (0.097)
attended school -0.237 -0.576 -0.491
(0.375) (0.017)* (0.053)
household expenditure -0.124 -0.290 -0.337
(0.002)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
desired children -0.943 -1219 -1319
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
previous pregnancies 0.192 0.192 0.190
(0.014)* (0.037)* (0.039)*
constant -2764 -3325 -3227
(0.014)* (0.006)** (0.007)**
Observations 127 127 127
robust p-values in parenthesis
∗significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
The estimated coefficients for the remaining controls go in the expected di-
rection. Age variables are positively significant, and suggest that ceteris paribus
younger women are more likely to adopt modern contraception (perhaps because
they are more fertile or sexually more active, or simply because younger cohorts
are more open to non-traditional behavior). Village effects are significant, while
caste dummies seem not to be. Having at least one year of education is not sig-
nificant in two out of three specifications presented, and negative in sign. This
negative sign seems to suggest that when women who are somehow educated do
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not use contraception, they are less incline to change this behavior afterward. In
other words, women with no education are more likely to choose their contracep-
tion habits because of external reasons like a lack of information, and therefore are
more easily impacted by the educational program. However, education in highly
correlated with caste belonging, which may explain part of the result.9 Household
monthly expenditure is significant and negative in sign, which suggests that FPC is
mostly used by those households who are financially constrained. As expected, an
unmet desire for children as proxied by the variable desired childreni discourages
contraception adoption, while a higher number of pregnancies encourages it.
2.4.3 Instrumental Variables Approach
In this subsection I extend my basic model correcting for the endogeneity in the di-
rect exposure to the FPC radio drama, and finally I introduce a few more controls
to check the robustness of my results.
In my current framework, there are two kinds of endogeneity to be concerned
about, both related to the fact that some unobserved characteristics, for instance
a priori attitude toward FPC, might be correlated with both the direct and indirect
exposure to the FPC radio drama and the contraception adoption. The current sub-
section treats the endogeneity of the direct exposure lead by the fact that women
may decide to listen or not to the FPC radio drama depending on their a priori
attitude. The second source of endogeneity, which relates to peer exposure and
indirect exposure, works indirectly through the choice of discussion partners. In
fact women may be more likely to exchange information with other women who
share their a priori attitude toward FPC. This second source of endogeneity will be
discussed in Section 2.5.
Running a Rivers and Vuong (1988) test, the exogeneity of direct exposure is
rejected with a p-value smaller than 1%. Therefore I make use of two instruments:
a dummy which equals one if the respondent reports to listen to the radio every-
day or almost everyday (radio dailyi) and a dummy which equals one if anybody
in her household owns a radio that works (radio ownedi) . Following Heckman
(1978) and Evans and Schwab (1995), I thus estimate the bivariate probit system
TREATi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡direct exposurei
=γ1radio dailyi + γ2radio ownedi + β1xi+
δ1
∑
i6=j
tij=1
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡peer exposurei
+δ2
∑
i6=j
tij=2
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡indirect exposurei
+1i
(2.4)
9Brahmins and Chhetris are the most educated: out of the 32 women in my sample, 15 have at least
one year of schooling, which account for 71% of total educate woman in the sample. On the other side,
out of the 82 Tharu women, only 2 of them have at least one year of schooling.
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yi =β2xi + δ0 TREATi︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡direct exposurei
+δ1
∑
i6=j
tij=1
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡peer exposurei
+
δ2
∑
i6=j
tij=2
TREATj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡indirect exposurei
+2i
(2.5)
where y∗i is the respondent unobserved propensity of using FPC, TREAT
∗
i is
her unobserved propensity of listening to the FPC radio drama,
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 otherwise
(2.6)
TREATi =
{
1 if TREAT ∗i > 0
0 otherwise
(2.7)
and (1, 2) are bivariate normal disturbances.
Table 2.2 presents the results from the bivariate probit estimation. The two
columns of (4) refer to the bivariate probit system estimated with the same set of
regressors as in Table 2.1. In the first column the results from ancillary equation
are reported while the second column refers to the main equation. All previous
findings are reconfirmed: not only direct exposurei, but also peer exposurei and
indirect exposurei are positive and significant. Interestingly, after its instrumenta-
tion the coefficient of direct exposurei has a significant increase in magnitude with
respect to the standard probit coefficients of Table 2.1. For what regards the other
variables, results are consistent with previous findings, with the only exception
that caste is now significant.
Finally, in the two columns of specification (5) I report an additional robust-
ness check adding a few additional regressors to the bivariate probit. Among
these additional regressors: a dummy young childi that equals one if the youn- gest
child has less than 18 months, and a dummy group belongingi that equal one if the
woman participates to a community group. Aside I also control for the percentage
of couple in the village that the respondent believes to use FPC methods. In fact,
the more people use FPC, the higher the individual probability of FPC adoption is,
because both uncertainty of the technology and social sanction decrease. However,
since this variable is likely to be endogenous (that is, women who use FPC meth-
ods may state that most people do so) I proxy this effect using this same piece of
information as it is in the 1997 baseline data. Therefore, the dichotomous variable
perceivedFPC usei equals one if in 1997 survey the respondent believed that
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Table 2.2: Bivariate Probit Results
(4) (5)
Dependent variable: Direct Adoption Direct Adoption
Exposure Exposure
direct exposure 1.878 1.867
(0.000)** (0.000)**
peer exposure -0.200 0.613 -0.257 0.633
(0.050)* (0.000)** (0.211) (0.001)**
indirect exposure 0.027 0.097 0.036 0.149
(0.849) (0.000)** (0.673) (0.008)**
18-25 0.457 0.907 0.463 1.335
(0.321) (0.008)** (0.513) (0.005)**
26-35 0.534 1.086 0.523 1.292
(0.159) (0.000)** (0.199) (0.000)**
village Tulsipur -0.856 2.537 -0.607 2.707
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.310) (0.000)**
village Urahari -0.425 2.495 0.015 2.374
(0.081) (0.000)** (0.980) (0.001)**
Brahmins or Chhetris 0.925 -1.255 1.122 -1.277
(0.000)** (0.023)* (0.010)** (0.000)**
Tharu 0.880 -1.038 0.977 -1.594
(0.133) (0.014)* (0.000)** (0.003)**
attended school 0.535 -0.863 0.613 -0.844
(0.530) (0.000)** (0.388) (0.000)**
household expenditure 0.124 -0.331 0.078 -0.378
(0.008)** (0.000)** (0.270) (0.000)**
desired children -0.176 -0.963 -0.199 -0.991
(0.707) (0.000)** (0.626) (0.000)**
previous pregnancies -0.036 0.217 -0.025 0.331
(0.834) (0.093) (0.879) (0.017)*
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Table 2.2: Bivariate Probit Results (Continued)
(4) (5)
young child -0.272 0.269
(0.261) (0.371)
group belonging -0.584 0.853
(0.008)** (0.031)*
perceived FPC use 0.377 0.455
(0.559) (0.422)
declared friends 0.156 -0.065
(0.609) (0.781)
constant -1.802 -3.775 -2.122 -4.499
(0.035)* (0.000)** (0.048)* (0.000)**
radio owned 1.172 1.233
(0.000)** (0.005)**
radio daily 0.852 0.810
(0.000)** (0.017)*
observations 127 127 127 127
robust p-values in parenthesis
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
more than half of the couples in their village were using a contraceptive method.
Finally, according to my definition, links are undirected, that is, two women are
considered connected if at least one of them mentions the other, but this does not
reflect the disparities between woman who mention several discussion partners,
and women who are mainly mentioned. In fact, women who mention several dis-
cussion partners may be more accurate in recalling their names because they are
more sensitive to the issue of FPC, and/or because at the time of the conversation
they were explicitly looking for information on the topic. In order to control for
this effect, the variable declared friendsi which expresses the number of friends
the woman has mentioned (rather than the total number of links, which is identi-
fied by her declarations as well as other women responses) is included among the
controls.
Results from (5) are comparable with the previous findings, and the importance
of indirect exposure is preserved. Additionally, group belongingi seems to posi-
tively affect contraception adoption, while the other three variables young childi,
perceivedFPC usei and declared friendsi are not significant.
2.5 Dealing with the Endogeneity of Networks
The endogeneity of network is the oldest argument, and still the most important
threat to the validity of any study dealing with peer effects. One can in fact argue
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that two women discuss FPC issues because they have a priori the same opinion.
If this was the case, this so-called assortative matching among discussion part-
ners would introduce a component of endogeneity in the variables accounting for
peer and indirect exposure, and bias the results presented in Section 2.4. Let us
assume that women with a good a priori opinion toward FPC are more likely to
listen to the radio drama, and that women select discussion partners with similar
a priori opinion toward FPC: in this case the coefficients for peer exposure and in-
direct exposure would absorb the effect of unobserved individual characteristics
(good a priori opinion toward FPC) and the impact of these variables would be
overestimated. This source of endogeneity is non-standard, and it cannot simply
be corrected with traditional techniques since the variables expressing peer expo-
sure and indirect exposure incorporate two pieces of information (namely the link
among women and the treatment status of all women in the community) that can-
not be disentangled. In what follows, an instrumental variable approach is used to
shed light on this point.
My goal is to estimate whether women in my sample choose FPC discussion
partners with their same a priori opinion. In the estimates reported in Table 2.3
the units of observation are the dyads, that is, the unique pairs of women within
the same village who may or may not have discussed FPC among them. Dyads’
number goes from 19530 to 13330, depending on the specification. For each dyad
ij, the dichotomous dependent variable linkij equals one if (at least) one of them
mentions the other among her FPC discussion partners.
In both 1997 baseline survey and 1999 follow-up survey respondents were asked
in details about their attitude toward FPC. This was assessed by asking them to
indicate their level of agreement on a four-point Likert scale to a battery of state-
ments. The statements were based on prior qualitative studies assessing the at-
titudes that influence contraceptive use in Nepal (see Boulay et al., 2002). Indi-
vidual items were then recoded with higher responses indicating a more favor-
able attitude toward family planning and with ”Don’t know” responses coded
at the midpoint. With this piece of information for each respondent two vari-
ables were calculated: FPC attitudei (referring to the 1999 follow-up survey) and
FPC attitude 1997i (referring to the 1997 baseline survey).10 In the entire sample,
10For each statement, the respondent stated one of the following: ”strongly agree”, ”agree”, ”don’t
know”, ”disagree”, ”strongly disagree”; these answers were coded in order from 1 to 5. The final
variables are the average score calculated on the following 18 statements: ”Each child is born because
of LUCK”, ”Children are a gift from God; we should accept them as they come along”, ”I would rather
have a boy than a girl”, ”It is necessary to keep having children until a boy is born”, ”If a wife has
only girls, the husband should marry another woman”, ”Child care is not a father’s responsibility”,
”People who use condoms are promiscuous”, ”Family planning causes promiscuity”, ”People who use
family planning lose the respect of their family and friends”, ”When a woman uses a contraceptive
method her husband becomes angry”, ”If a woman uses a temporary contraceptive method, she may
become sterile”, ”Religion is against a woman using family planning methods”, ”Contraceptives have
dangerous side-effects”, ”The majority of people who use family planning are rich”, ”Wives should get
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the correlation between FPC attitudei and FPC attitude 1997i is 0.19.
The network declared in 1997 survey is almost totally different from the one
declared in 1999: the percentage of 1997 ties that were dropped in 1999 survey is
71%, 74% and 85% for the three villages respectively, and the percentage of new
ties that were added in 1999 is 92%, 78% and 80% (Boulay et al., 2002). Therefore I
can estimate whether the existence of a link is connected to the same a priori opin-
ion about FPC, instrumenting the current attitude with the past one: when a link
ij exists in the 1999 follow-up data, opinion of agent i in 1997 is by construction
correlated to her own opinion in 1999 but not to the opinion of agent j in 1999.
My variables of interests are: the current difference in FPC attitude between the
two partners gap FPC attitudeij = |FP attitudei − FP attitudej |, and the analo-
gous variable gapFPC attitude 1997ij calculated on the 1997 baseline survey data.
The specification (6) in Table 2.3 reports the results from a standard probit model
with link ij as dependent variable and gap FPC attitudeij among the regressors.
In (7) the variable gap FPC attitude 1997ij is used instead. Finally, (8) I report re-
sults from a probit model with endogenous regressors, where gap FPC attitudeij
is instrumented with gap FPC attitude 1997ij .
The remaining dyadic covariates are common to all three specifications. Among
them, I include: the age difference between i and j, two dummies equal to one
if both women or none of them has ever attended school respectively, a dummy
equal to one if the women belong to the same caste, and their difference in house-
hold monthly expenditure (in rupees, rescaled). I also include control dummies
which are respectively equal to one if both women have already been pregnant,
both have a child less than 1.5 years old, both belong to a community group, and
they have a language in common. Village fix effects are also included.
When in (6) only the current difference in FPC attitude is taken into account,
this not surprisingly turns out to be significant and negative in sign, that is, ex post
FPC attitudes of discussion partners is likely to converge as a result of reciprocal
influence. However, when in (7) I use the 1997 gap in attitude to proxy for the a pri-
ori divergence instead, its coefficient is not significant anymore. As a final step, in
(8) the current gap FPC attitudeij is instrumented with gap FPC attitude 1997ij ,
and results also reconfirm that the a priori gap in attitude does not affect link for-
mation. Taken altogether this evidence suggests that, even if discussion naturally
leads to ex post convergence in opinion, women seem not to choose their discus-
sion partners on the basis of their ex ante opinion about FPC issues.
their husband’s permission before taking any contraceptives”, ”Sterilization makes you weak”, ”Pills
make you weak”, ”Sterilization gives you a backache”.
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Table 2.3: Dyadic Analysis, Probit and IV Probit Coefficients
Dependent variable: linkij
(6) (7) (8)
Probit Probit Biprobit
gap FPC attitude -0.066 -0.100
(0.013)* (0.956)
gap FPC attitude 1997 -0.004
(0.957)
age difference -0.020 -0.028 -0.027
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
both schooling 0.220 0.189 0.195
(0.034)* (0.006)** (0.013)*
none schooling -0.285 -0.369 -0.384
(0.057) (0.004)** (0.299)
same caste 0.785 0.830 0.823
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
difference in expenditure -0.012 -0.017 -0.017
(0.000)** (0.004)** (0.003)**
both already pregnant 0.280 -0.027 -0.031
(0.000)** (0.523) (0.292)
both have a child <1.5 years -0.016 0.015 0.018
(0.885) (0.886) (0.801)
both in a community group 0.561 0.636 0.623
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.004)**
language in common 0.515 0.464 0.469
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
village Tulsipur 0.223 0.248 0.246
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.012)*
village Urahari -0.221 -0.197 -0.214
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.558)
constant -2.992 -2.572 -2.493
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.128)
observations 19530 13330 13330
robust p-values in parenthesis
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
According to my dyadic analysis, several variables other than ex ante opinion
are determinants of link formation. In particular, my results suggest that women
are more likely to discuss FPC issues if they are close in age, they both had some
schooling, they belong to the same caste, they have a similar economic status prox-
ied by their household monthly expenditure, they both belong to a community
group or they share a common language. These variables altogether define the
social group for the women in these villages, and it is within the border of this
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reference group that women communicate and exchange information.
To conclude, since it seems to be the case that women get together to discuss
FPC issues on the basis of individual and social characteristics other than their ex
ante opinion, results from the dyadic analysis are against the hypothesis of overes-
timation of indirect treatment effects. Findings from Section 2.4 suggest that peer
exposure and indirect exposure to the FPC radio drama increase the probability
of adopting a modern contraception method. The dyadic results presented in the
current section rule out endogeneity of network links to reconfirm the validity of
previous findings.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter focuses on three villages in rural Nepal where an educational radio
program about family planning and contraception methods is weekly broadcasted,
and women share this new information during their informal discussions with
friends. I study how information is spread among peers, focusing on the role
of the community as a bridge for information flows. My goal is to estimate the
magnitude of information spillovers from indirect contacts, and evaluate whether
indirect information affect women’s decision of adopting a modern contraception
method. This chapter contributes to the literatures of networks and peer-effects.
Previous studies on peer-effects consider the individual outcome as a function of
his characteristics, and the characteristics of his neighborhood of friends. How-
ever in doing so, they disregard the network effects. Even if women exchange
information with their direct friends only, through them they have access to the
information spread by thirds. I therefore take a wider perspective, considering not
only direct peers, but also indirect contacts as determinants of individual outcome.
In order to do that, I explicitly take into account the social structure of the commu-
nity that emerges from the self-reported links among women. That is, following
network theory I claim and demonstrate than in equilibrium not only direct friends
matter, but also the friends of these friends, and all other agents in the community
can impact individual outcome through network spillovers.
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2.7 Appendix B
Figure 1.B.1: The Network in the Village of Gobardia
Figure 1.B.2: The Network in the Village of Tulsipur
Figure 1.B.3: The Network in the Village of Urahari
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Table 1.B: Descriptive Statistics (n=127)
Variable Mean s.d. P value11
direct exposure 0.496 0.502 0.657
peer exposure 0.906 1.123 0.087
indirect exposure 1.528 2.096 0.867
18-25 0.504 0.502 0.136
26-35 0.370 0.485 0.070
village Tulsipur 0.260 0.440 0.320
village Urahari 0.457 0.500 0.164
Brahmins or Chhetris 0.252 0.436 0.983
Tharu 0.646 0.480 0.645
attended school 0.165 0.373 0.395
household expenditure 2.449 1.367 0.481
desired children 0.772 0.632 0.000
previous pregnancies 3.110 2.063 0.010
young child 0.606 0.491 0.354
group belonging 0.110 0.314 0.030
perceived FPC use 0.354 0.480 0.292
declared friends 0.945 1.157 0.660
radio owned 0.512 0.502 0.394
radio daily 0.496 0.502 0.315
11P-value for the t-test on the women who adopted FPC methods and the one who did not (n=20 and
n=107, respectively), for the H0 of no statistically significant difference among the two groups.
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Table 2.B: Marginal Effects of (3), Table 2.1
Dependent variable: FPC adoption
direct exposure 0 .0431
(0.004)**
peer exposure 0 .0519
(0.000)***
indirect exposure 0 .0126
(0.090)*
18-25 0 .0786
(0.002)**
26-35 0 .0756
(0.000)***
village Tulsipur 0 .4638
(0.000)***
village Urahari 0 .3456
(0.000)***
Brahmins or Chhetris -0 .0534
(0.027)**
Tharu -0 .1007
(0.183)
ever attended school -0 .0298
(0.042)**
household expenditure -0 .0270
(0.000)***
desired children -0 .1059
(0.000)***
previous pregnancies 0 .0153
(0.032)**
observations 127
robust p-values in parenthesis
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%
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Chapter 3
Democracies, Politics and Arms
Supply: A Bilateral Trade
Equation
3.1 Introduction
The trade in arms, especially when it involves developing countries, has crucial
economic and ethic implications: the latest report estimates that the last 15 years
of conflicts have cost Africa around 300$ billions (a sum that is equivalent to in-
ternational aid from major donors in the same period), and that at least 95% of
Africa’s most commonly used conflict weapons come from outside the continent.1
However, even though during the past decades the public concern on the mar-
ket for arms has increased exponentially, it has not received equal attention by
economists and political science scholars. As a better understanding of the arms
market functioning is the first step toward efficient policy measures, this study
wants to be a contribution in this direction.
The economic papers focused on arms trade are not very numerous. All these
contributions either are theoretical (Peleg, 1977; Levine and Smith, 1995; Levine
and Smith, 1997; Levine and Smith, 2000) or relate to the demand side of arms
trade (Smith and Tasiran, 2005; Pearson, 1989; Kollias and Sirakoulis, 2002) while
the determinants of arms supply haven’t been investigated yet. My empirical anal-
ysis focuses on the supply side of arms market to answer a question that relates to
economics and politics: whether the government’s political orientation in the ex-
porting country influences the amount of arms actually supplied to third countries.
To answer this question, a gravity-type bilateral equation with a TOBIT framework
is estimated for the years 1975-2004. Gravity-type equations have never been ap-
plied to arms trade, while they are commonly used in trade literature (Bergstrand,
1IANSA, Oxfam, and Safeworld (2007).
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1985; Egger, 2000). In particular I refer to Summary (1989) who uses a gravity
framework to check whether international political factors affect US trade.
Since the market of arms shows different features for different products, I re-
strict the attention to major conventional weapons (henceforth MCW), a techno-
logically advanced share of the arms production sector. MCW include aircrafts,
armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships; it does not include
small arms.2 All along the XXth century the MCW industry has been highly con-
centrated: my studies focuses on the 20 major MCW exporting countries, which
alone account for 97% of total worldwide exports for the period 1975-2004. Only
five out of these twenty countries have ever experienced an autocratic regime.
Most of the following analysis focuses on the remaining democracies, which ac-
count for more than 65% of total MCW exports for the period 1975-2004.
The trade in arms is not just business but also a foreign policy issue, involv-
ing strategic and political interests together with economic ones (Krause, 1991;
Smith, Humm and Fontanel, 1985; Skons, 2000). International relations during
the Cold War have alimented the general perception of arms trade being a political
affair, which is far from being naı¨ve since governments can influence the arms ex-
port process through several channels. The market for arms lacks an international
regulation, being therefore subject to each country’s sovereignty. Arms export li-
censes are exclusively granted by governmental agencies (mostly inter-ministerial
committees)3, and can be easily revoked by them. Even if nowadays licenses for
some destinations are automatically granted, the armament industry is still under
national control: in virtually all exporting countries a relevant share of the arms
industry is state property.4 Moreover, arms orders are political tools in that they
may be used to boost the employment of industrial regions.5 In fact the armament
sector attracts subsidies and other measures in defense of national industry. A
well-documented case is the export credits granted by the UK Export Credit Gov-
ernmental Department. Martin (1999) concludes that in the UK each job generated
by arms export is subsidized by just under 2000 pounds per annum and that a one-
third reduction in UK defense exports would save the taxpayer 76 million pounds
per annum at 1995 prices. For an overview of the national export controls system
2For what concerns small arms the share of black market is greater, and therefore no reliable and an
exhaustive dataset of transfers is available. Moreover, the industry is less concentrated and nowadays
most countries, even among developing ones, produces some amounts of small arms.
3Few countries have made their arms licensing regulation more transparent through secondary leg-
islation, while the majority of them leave all details to inter-ministerial committees. The license deci-
sions pass through the inter-ministerial committee responsible for them; defense, economic, security
ministries and parliament are normally represented. Regulated systems are flexible and subject to var-
ied interpretation and enforcement by the government. For an essay on the topic, see Miller and Brooks
(2001).
4The list of Top 100 arms-producing companies (containing information on sales, profit, employ-
ment and ownership) is provided by SIPRI and on line on its website.
5Martin, Hartley and Stafford (1999) estimate the potential effect of a reduction of UK arms exports
on national employment.
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of major MCW see Appendix D, which reports for each exporter detailed informa-
tion on legislation of reference, licensing authority and consultation procedures,
end-user requirements, types of licenses and procedures for license negotiation,
exemption and revocation.
Thus, assuming that arms trade is both an economic and a foreign policy is-
sue, and that governments control arms exports through different channels, it is
worth to test whether the government’s political orientation affects arms export
decisions. In Section 3.5, I first provide evidence that arms export trends from
democratic and autocratic regimes differ, and then exclude from the sample major
non-democratic MCW producers to concentrate on democracies only. My aim is
to assess eventual differences between right, center or left wing democratic execu-
tives in arms export policy.
In the empirical specification adopted, the amount of conventional arms trans-
ferred among countries is the dependent variable of a bilateral trade equation that
develops along three dimensions: importer, exporter and time. The sample of ex-
porter is restricted to the twenty major arms producers, while importers are all in-
dependent countries recognized by UN. The equation is estimated for years 1975-
2004, that is, the core of Cold War and the years right after. The strategy followed
is rather innovative because I estimate a panel TOBIT; why this choice is consistent
with the nature of data and the scope of the analysis will be discussed in Section
3.3.
The results give original insights into the phenomenon of arms trade, suggest-
ing that in democratic countries the government in power being right wing signif-
icantly increases the quantity of arms exported. This may reflect a general right-
wing tendency to lower trade barriers, with its consequences on deregularization
of heavy industry exports, or a greater importance of national industry in political
agenda, resulting in a higher economic support toward the armament sector.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature, while in Section 3.3 the model is described. Section 3.4 goes over data
and variables in use. In Section 3.5 results are presented, and Section 3.6 concludes.
Tables and figures are presented in Appendix C. Appendix D contains an overview
of arms national export control systems for the exporter countries.
3.2 Literature Review
As previous contributions point out (Krause, 1991; Smith, Humm and Fontanel,
1985; Skons, 2000), trade in arms is not just business but also a foreign policy is-
sue, involving strategic and political interests together with economic ones. This
chapter departs from this evidence to investigate whether the political orientation
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of the arms exporter’s government has an impact on the quantity of arms supplied
to third countries.
As Hartley and Sandler (1995) point out, there is surprisingly little theoretical
and empirical development of the economics of arms trade, and the few contribu-
tions face the central problem of going beyond the proliferation of (albeit useful)
policy position articles, to a more solid base of theoretical and empirical models.
Most studies on arms market follow the theoretical approach initiated by Pe-
leg (1977). Among them, Levine and Smith (1995) propose a dynamic model of
arms trade where there are a small number of profit-oriented suppliers and a large
number of buyers, and they use the model to evaluate the potential effectiveness
of arms control regimes. On an analogous line, Levine and Smith (2000) develop
a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market to compare different
regimes, from laissez-faire to a common defense policy. Levine and Smith (1997)
model a game between two hostile countries getting involved in arms races; this
framework will be later extended to birth-death stochastic processes by Kollias and
Sirakoulis (2002).
The empirical contributions on arms market are not numerous and mostly re-
late to the demand side. Pearson (1989) identifies clusters of variables correlated
with arms imports levels, while Smith and Tasiran (2005) estimate the determi-
nants of arms imports for a panel of 52 countries. On the supply side, Blan-
ton (2000) focuses on US arms export policy checking whether human rights and
democratic governance are determinants of arms transfers. On a different line,
Brauer (2000) compares potential and actual levels of production in arms producer
countries.
To the best of my knowledge, no previous empirical study has simultaneously
taken into account demand and supply side of the arms market. Gravity-type
equations have been extensively used in economics of trade (Frankel and Romer,
1999; Egger, 2000; Anderson and Wincoop, 2003), while I am the first one applying
the gravity model to explain the equilibrium level of arms traded. In particular I
refer to Summary (1989) who develops a gravity-type bilateral equation to check
whether, apart from traditional economic variables, also international political fac-
tors affect US generic trade.
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3.3 The Model
The econometric specification in use departs from previous gravity equation lit-
erature, since a panel TOBIT model is adopted. A TOBIT specification seems the
most appropriate because the amount of arms traded between two countries for a
given year equals zero for an important proportion of observations (around 90%
in the basic specification). The abstract model estimated is thus
Yijt =
{
Y ∗ijt if Y
∗
ijt > 0
0 if Y ∗ijt ≤ 0
given
Y ∗ijt = x
‘
ijtβ + cij + uijt
uijt|xij , cij ∼ N(0, σ2u)
where cij ∼ N(0, σ2u) describes the unobserved random effect and the set of vari-
ables x‘ijt explain both the latent variable Y
∗
ijt and the observed outcome.
The panel is unbalanced and evolves along three dimensions: exporter, im-
porter and time; the year and the pair exporter×importer identify each dependent
observation. The period under analysis is 1975-2004, where all data are available. I
take into account the twenty major MCW producer countries from the overall 1950-
2006 rank by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). These
exporters -in order of importance- are: the USA, the USSR, the UK, France, Rus-
sia, China, West Germany (FRG), Czechoslovakia, Italy, Unified Germany (GMY),
Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Poland, Israel, Spain, Ukraine, Switzerland, Brazil,
Norway. These twenty countries alone account for 97% of total MCW exports for
the period 1975-2004; adding more exporters would results in a computationally
intractable dataset.6 Out of the twenty countries in the sample, the non-democratic
ones are: the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland 1975-1988, Brazil 1975-1984.
Taking away these cases, the remaining democracies still account for more than
65% of total MCW exports for the period 1975-2004. On the import side, all 200 in-
dependent countries recognized by UN and existing in the period under analysis
are included in the sample of potential importers, subject to data availability.7
6MCW trade is not frequent. Even reducing the sample of the exporters to twenty producers, in 90%
of the observations the quantity of arms traded is zero. If we build a squared dataset where all existing
countries are potential exporters, the dataset becomes computationally intractable.
7Importing and exporting countries are classified as in the Correlated of War Project 2005 State Sys-
tem Membership List, v2004.1. The only exception is Russia and the USSR which I code separately
(USSR data goes until 1991 included, and Russia from 1992 onwards). For the sake of completeness
I have also included among potential arms importers the countries that have never imported nor ex-
ported arms (Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, East Timor, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru,
San Marino, Sao Tome e Principe, Santa Lucia, Nauru).
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The equation to be estimated is thus
armsijt = β0 + xijt + δij + uijt (3.0)
Where the dependent variable is the MCW flow from country i to country j at
time t, and the covariates xijt vary along one or more dimensions. The random
effect terms δij refer to bilateral interactions between countries and are therefore
supposed to describe time-invariant geographical-political-historical-cultural rela-
tions like long run government friendship and colonialism, and trade impediment
measures as distance, common language, and border dummies. By construction
δij also account for individual exporter effects.
A last issue to be mentioned is the time delay in the delivery of arms. Since
many different categories of arms are grouped under the MCW label, no theory
can help us assess the amount of time between the signature of the contract and the
delivery of the good. Procedures vary from country to country, as reported in the
Appendix D. Despite this, it seems reasonable to assume that responses to political
changes are relatively fast. Even if the production of some arms can take up to
a few years, licenses are usually required not for the negotiation of the contract
but for the delivery.8 When licenses to delivery arms are granted, they expire in a
relatively short time (within one year for France and Italy). Moreover, licenses can
be discretionally revoked by the governmental agency at any time, or at least under
a wide range of circumstances. Therefore, although specifications with lags have
been run as well, it seems reasonable to test the model in the structure presented
above.
3.4 Data and Variables Description
This section is devoted to present the main features of the data and the variables in
use. Different specifications make use of different subsets of variables, which are
all described here for the sake of simplicity. The subscripts following each variable
name (i for exporter, j for importer, t for time) are there to remind along which
dimensions the variable varies. Unless differently specified, the data are available
for the years 1975-2004, which is the time span of the basic specification, that is,
8A license is required also to open negotiations in few specific cases, enumerated in what follows.
In Germany an authorization to negotiate is necessary only if intermediaries located in foreign territory
are involved. In Italy, companies must be in the national register of arms exporting companies to be able
to contract for exports of military items. In the USA negotiation is free, except if technical information
relevant for national security is revealed in the course of contract. In France licenses are required both
for negotiating and delivering arms; in any case, the two procedures are independently conducted and
both licenses expire within one year, which is a reasonably short time length.
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the smaller period for which all data are available.
Data on MCW trade come from the Arms Transfers Database by the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).9 MCW consist in aircrafts, ar-
mored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships; they do not include
small arms and light weapons.10 SIPRI data register MCW transfers to sovereign
countries (as well as international organizations, rebel groups, factions and non-
governmental armed forces, as they appear under a recipients´ heading different
from the country’s central government). In order to be registered in the SIPRI
dataset weapons must be transferred voluntarily by the supplier and must have
a military purpose; time of transfer refers to the moment when delivery is regis-
tered. Units of arms are computed according to a trend indicator value system de-
veloped specifically by SIPRI for this purpose: instead of economic price, it reflects
amounts transferred. The SIPRI trend indicator measures military resources by in-
cluding an evaluation of the technical parameters of the weapon: similar weapons
have similar values. Thus the concept of military resources reflects both the quan-
tity and the quality of the weapons transferred.11 The quantity measure by SIPRI
is a trend indicator that registers the changes in flows of military resources; this
feature improves the quality of the information in several ways. First, in many
cases no reliable data on the economic value of a transfer are available. Second,
even if the value of a transfer is known, it is in almost every case the total value of
a deal, which may include not only the weapons themselves but also other related
items (e.g., spare parts, armament or ammunition, specialized vehicles, software
changes to existing systems, or training). Third, even if the value of a transfer is
known, important details about the financial arrangements of the transfer (e.g.,
credit/loan conditions and discounts) are usually not known. On the other side,
the SIPRI trend indicator not only registers arms sales, but every form of weapons
supply including aid and gifts (even if along the chapter I mention arms trade, it
would be more appropriate to only refer to arms transfers). The SIPRI data thus
describe the volume of arms transfers, not the actual financial value of these trans-
fers or the price dynamics. However, the political focus of my analysis is consis-
tent with the measure adopted: MCW are both economic goods and foreign policy
instruments, and in any case, price would not convey all information on MCW
transfers, as their flows follow bilateral agreements and do not respond uniquely
9On line at http://armstrade.sipri.org
10Focusing on MCW only ensures consistency of the estimates, since the market for small arms has
different features than the MCW market. Notably, the share of black market is greater and therefore
no reliable and exhaustive dataset of small arms transfers is available. Moreover, the industry is less
concentrated and nowadays most countries, even among developing ones, produce some amounts of
small arms.
11For a number of weapon types it is possible to find the actual average unit acquisition price in
open sources. Those weapons with a real price are used as reference points, and all other weapons
for which a price is not known are assigned a value in an index, reflecting their military resources in
relation to core weapons. Therefore, SIPRI data cannot be compared with other trade data. For a deeper
description of the methodology see Hagelin and Wezeman (2005).
66 Democracies, Politics and Arms Supply
to market laws. On the other hand, a quantity measure incorporates not only arms
sold for profit but also weapons that have been transferred as political aid at a zero
price and would not show up in financial statistics. For all these reasons, the SIPRI
trend measure is preferred over available alternatives.12 In all specifications pre-
sented in what follows, the dependent variable armsijt describes MCW flow from
country i to country j at time t as from the SIPRI trend indicator. Only sovereign
countries are taken into account, while other entities such as international organi-
zations and non-governmental armed forces are omitted. The SIPRI data are also
used to construct two variables accounting for country-specific and worldwide
trends in arms flows. total exportsijt is calculated as the total arms flow out of the
exporter country at time t minus the term armsijt , and expressed in thousands
of units. It is aimed to capture MCW sector fluctuations in the exporter country.
worldwide exportsijt is calculated as the total world exports at time t minus the
term armsijt, and expressed in thousands of units. Analogously to a single-year
dummy, it captures business cycle in worldwide arms flow.
Data on democracy come from the Polity IV Project by the Center for Global
Policy of George Mason University. I use the composite polity indicator that ranges
from -10 (strongly autocratic regime) to +10 (strong democracy);13 for further clar-
ifications I remand to Marshall and Jaggers (2005). I make use of two variables, re-
ferring to democracy level of importer and exporter respectively. democratic expor-
terit is a dummy that equals one if the exporter’s polity indicator takes a value
greater than zero. I adopt this dichotomous classification for the sake of simplicity,
but it does not affect the quality of results since the distribution of the polity indi-
cator is almost bimodal: in 96% of the cases where democratic exporterit equals
zero the polity indicator is equal to or smaller than -4, and similarly for 96% of
the cases where the dummy democratic exporterit equals one the polity indicator
is equal to or greater than +6. Additionally, in some specification I include the
variable polity importerjt for the level of democracy/autocracy of the importer
country, which takes discrete value from -10 to +10.
Variables reflecting political orientations come from the World Bank Develop-
12The only alternative source of data on arms trade is the World Military Expenditure and Arms
Transfers (WMEAT) published by the US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance.
The WMEAT measure covers not only conventional arms, but also small weapons. Unlike the SIPRI
index, WMEAT is an economic value measure, and it registers arms bundles sold on the commercial
market. As Brzoska (1982) points out, the WMEAT measure has several major problems. First, coverage
is worse than in the SIPRI measure. Second, in the many cases where prices are not available, a cost
model estimated for US arms industry has been applied to other countries including the USSR, which
leads to serious biases as long as the industrial and employment structure of the two countries are
not comparable. Third, the WMEAT measure underestimates the role of western suppliers other than
the USA and the USSR. Moreover, WMEAT data are not based on open sources of information but on
statistics from US intelligence service. Given these reliability problems and the focus of my analysis,
consistently with other existing literature the SIPRI index has been preferred.
13The indicator converts special cases (as interruption, interregnum, anarchy or transition) to tradi-
tional scores in the range from -10 to +10.
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ment Research Group’s Database of Political Institutions, DPI2004. I make use of
the orientation of chief executive instead of the orientation of the main party in
power, since the former is also applicable to regimes different from representa-
tive democracy. The variable I adopt classifies the political orientation of the chief
executive with respect to economic policy. The executives are classified as one
of the followings: Right (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing), Left
(communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing), Center (for parties that are
defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist, e.g.
party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context).14 All
those cases that do not fit into the above-mentioned category (i.e. party’s plat-
form does not focus on economic issues, or there are competing wings), or for
whom there is no information, or there is no executive, are coded as missing. Just
to mention a few examples: all USSR executives are classified as left, while for
what regards the USA, Carter (1977-1981) and Clinton (1993-2001) are classified
as left, Regan (1981-1989), G.H.W. Bush (1989-1993) and G.W. Bush (2001-present)
as right. For the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) is classified as
right, while Tony Blair (1998-2007) as left. Italian leaders belonging to the Chris-
tian Democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana) are classified as centrist for the pe-
riod 1975-1983 and 1988-1992. For further information on DPI2004 I remand to
Beck et. al. (2001). In the empirical specifications, the variables in use are the fol-
lowing: two dummies center exporterit and left exporterit describe the political
orientation of the chief executive in the MCW exporter country, while the omit-
ted category is right exporterit. In some specifications I also include a dummy
same orientationijt that equals one if the chief executives in exporter and importer
countries are both left, both center, or both right.
Common sense suggests that armed conflicts in act in the importing country
may proxy for the demand side of MCW market. Data on conflict come from the
Armed Conflict Database 2007, provided by the International Peace Research Insti-
tute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UC- DP). This dataset
provides detailed information on the type and the severity of conflicts that took
place between independent states and/or political factions from 1946 onwards.
Conflicts are classified in four categories: interstate armed conflict (which occurs
between two or more states), internationalized internal armed conflict (which oc-
curs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups
with intervention from other states), internal armed conflict (which occurs between
the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without in-
tervention from other states), and extra-systemic armed conflict (which occurs be-
tween a state and a non-state group outside its own territory). When a sovereign
country has two or more conflicts in the same year, I take the most severe one, ac-
cording to the following decreasing order of severity: interstate, internationalized
14Parties where competing factions average out to a centrist position (e.g. a party of ”right-wing
Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists”) are NOT defined as centrist.
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internal, internal and extra-systemic armed conflict. In some specification I use a
dummy conflict importerjt which equals one if the importing country is involved
in an armed conflict of any of the types above. In other specifications I put separate
dummies for different types of conflicts: interstate conflictjt, internal conflictjt
and internationalized conflictjt equal one if a conflict of the correspondent type is
in act in the importer country. The reference category is a situation in which there
is no ongoing conflict, and the extrasystemic conflict category is dropped from the
estimates for the exiguous number of observation in the period spanned by data.
Data for per capita GDP and population, which proxy for countries’ supply and
demand potentials, come from the Penn World Table Version 6.2 (2007) provided
by the Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at
the University of Pennsylvania. The variables pgdp exporterit and pgdp importerjt
refer to the countries’ per capita GDP expressed in thousands of US$, while popula-
tion exporterit and population importerjt refer to the countries’ population in mil-
lions of inhabitants.
In the international market for arms, a formal obstacle to trade is represented by
the international embargoes, which are relatively frequent and whose effectiveness
is highly controversial. There are several types of embargo: international organi-
zations such as the UN, the OECD or the EU impose mandatory or non-mandatory
embargoes, and some countries also initiate unilateral export restrictions (such as
the United Kingdom which has done this thirty-two times in recent years). I re-
strict my attention to mandatory arms embargoes imposed by the UN and retrieve
my information combining UN secretariat sources15 and the SIPRI dataset on in-
ternational arms embargoes.16 This leads to the dummy embargojt equal to one if
the importer country is under a UN mandatory arms embargo regime.
Geographical and cultural factors may correlate with trade. I thus include the
variable distanceij which refers to the average distance between the two countries
in thousands of kilometers as from the Gledistch and Ward minimum distance
data (see Gledistch and Ward, 2001). Trade exchanges between two countries also
lead to a diplomatic familiarity and an economic interdependence that may facili-
tate MCW trade, and thus I add a variable total tradeijt representing trade flows
between the two countries expressed in billions of US$. These data come from the
Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset described by Gledistch (2002) which cover the
period 1948-2000.
All democratic MCW exporters proclaim an ideological concern for human
rights and a firm rejection of their abuse. Therefore I also explicitly control for the
15”The Experience of the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions”,
background paper by UN Secretariat prepared for the Second Experts Seminar, Berlin, December 2000.
16On line at http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/embargoes.html
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level of human right violations in the importer country, as it may be a deterrent for
MCW trade. Data come from the Political Terror Scale dataset that measures states’
human rights record for the period 1980-2005 translating human right reports from
Amnesty International and the US State Department. I choose the score derived
from Amnesty International reports. The variable human right violationsjt thus
represent the human rights violations in act in the importer country at time t ex-
pressed in a five-point interval scale, where a higher score indicates more severe
violations.
Finally, in most specifications a dummy variable post Cold Wart taking value
one for years 1990 onwards is included. This variable is interesting by itself, as
long as it could capture a shock in international arms trade due to worldwide de-
militarization, and it is interacted with several other variables.
Variables’ descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix C, Table 2.C.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Democracies vs. Autocracies
Given the political focus of this analysis, it is straightforward to set a first dis-
tinction based on the nature of the political regime: whether it is democratic of
autocratic. Since MCW not only are tradable goods, but also policy instruments,
democracies and autocracies may follow different rules and may weigh purely eco-
nomic or political incentives to trade differently. Moreover, since the idea of trade
liberalization does not apply to autocratic rules, there is no a priori reason why left
and right autocratic regimes should differ with respect to arms exporting policy.
In order to give substance to these intuitive arguments, in what follows I provide
evidence that democracies and autocracies differ with respect to their MCW ex-
porting behavior.
The results presented in Appendix C, Table 3.C are based on the full sample
of twenty exporters, where democracies account for about 65% and autocracies for
about 35% of total MCW exports (See Section 3.3). All results refer to a gravity-type
TOBIT that develops along the three dimensions exporter-importer-time, where
the dependent variable is the amount of MCW transferred.
In column (1) the dummy democratic exporterit captures disparities in overall
arms exporting behavior. In addition the typical controls from trade literature are
included: per capita gdp and population of both exporter and importer, whether
there is an embargo or a generic conflict in act in the importer country, geographi-
cal distance and total trade flows between the two countries.
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Column (2) refers to a model analogous to the previous one with an additional
feature: each control is interacted with the dummy democratic exporterit. This is a
straightforward test to capture different behaviors of democracies and autocracies
with respect of any of the previous dimensions.
Finally, column (3) is the same as (2) with an additional control for the political
orientation of the exporter expressed by the two dummies center exporterit and
left exporterit.
Since most of the interaction terms are significant, results from Table 3.C sug-
gest that democratic and autocratic regimes show different determinants of MCW
exporting behavior. It is worth noticing that the interaction terms for population
exporterit and pgdp importerjt are positive and significant, which may be in-
terpreted as democratic exporters being more sensitive to pure economic incen-
tives and less constrained by ideological motivations, in that only populous coun-
tries have a sufficient industrial diversification to produce MCW and that the im-
porter’s GDP proxies for his willingness to pay.
Turning to (3), the exporter’s executive being center or left oriented seems to
decrease the quantity of MCW exported with respect to the omitted category of
right executive in power, but the disparities of behavior between democracies and
autocracies remain. Regardless of their political orientation democracies export
less MCW, and their exporting behavior follows different rules. Therefore, the next
section will focus on democracies to explore in depth how the political orientations
impact their arms export policies.
3.5.2 The Political Orientation of Democratic Exporters
The previous subsection has shown that democratic and autocratic regimes differ
with respect to their arms exporting behavior. I now restrict my attention to the sub
sample of democratic MCW exporters (eliminating USSR, Czechoslovakia, China,
Poland 1950-1988, Brazil 1964-1984).
Results in Appendix C, Table 4.C still refer to a gravity-type equation in a panel
TOBIT framework where the dependent variable is the amount of MCW trans-
ferred in a given year. The various columns (4) to (10) start with an exiguous
number of controls and progressively add more covariates.
In (4) only basic controls are used, that is, the political orientation of the ex-
porter and per capita GDP and population of both exporter and importer. (5) also
controls for embargoes and ongoing conflicts in the importer country, with sepa-
rate dummies for internationalized, external and extra-systemic conflict. In (6) the
dummies post Cold Wart and same orientationijt are included and interacted, in
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order to take into account the changes in the international scenario at the end of the
Cold War. In fact during the Cold War the political orientation also reflected block
division, while after 1990 a major political break and a simultaneous MCW market
restructuring took place.17 (7) adds controls for exporter-specific and worldwide
trends in arms flows, specified as in Section 3.4. In (8) I include geographical dis-
tance and the value of trade flows between exporter and importer. In line with
previous studies18 (9) control for the democracy and human rights violations in
the importing country, since all exporters formally share an ideological concern
for these issues. Finally, in (10) polity importerjt and post Cold Wart are inter-
acted. During Cold War the countries in communist block were in fact classified
as non-democratic and thus in principle before 1990 democracies’ reluctance to ex-
port to non-democratic countries might have been just due to the fact that many
non-democratic countries were part of the communist block.
Results from Appendix C, Table 4.C show a robust pattern: exporter’s chief ex-
ecutive being right wing has a positive and significant impact on MCW exports.
This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to lower trade barriers, with its con-
sequences on deregularization of heavy industry exports, or a greater importance
of national industry in political agenda, resulting in a higher economic support to-
ward heavy armament sector.
All other results go in the expected direction: the exporter country being more
populous increases the quantity of MCW traded, which is not surprising given
that MCW are highly specialized goods. On the other side, the per capita GDP
of the exporter does not show any clear pattern. For what regards the importer
country, both population and per capita GDP are positively significant, as they
may proxy for exporter’s likelihood to pay in the MCW open market. UN em-
bargo pending on importer country is negative, but only occasionally significant,
in line with the high rate of non-compliance reported by anecdotic and official
sources.19 For what regards the conflicts in act in importer country, only internal
conflicts (that is, conflicts between the government of a state and one or more in-
ternal opposition group) are significant. The dummy post Cold Wart is significant
itself, consistently with the general crisis in arms production industry that led to
a general reduction of 40% in military expenditure and international arms trans-
fers.20 From (4) to (9), the dummy same orientationijt and its interaction with
17The end of Cold War brought a general reduction of 40% in military expenditure and international
arms transfers. For a deeper discussion see Skons (2000) and Dunne, Garcia Alonso, Levine and Smith
(2003).
18Blanton (2000) tested whether respect human rights and democratic governance are relevant for US
arms export policy. Applying a two-stage Heckman model, she concludes that in the initial decision-
making stage, human rights and democracy are important determinants of the eligibility of countries
to receive arms, in the second stage democracy is still significant while human rights no longer affect
the quantity of arms to be transferred.
19See Amnesty International, IANSA, and Oxfam International (2006).
20Skons (2000) and Dunne, Garcia Alonso, Levine and Smith (2003).
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the post Cold Wart dummy are significantly positive and negative respectively.
That is, exporter and importer having the same political orientation used to play
a role in MCW trade, but the magnitude of the bias dropped after the end of the
Cold War. However, it is interesting to notice that when in (10) the interaction
polity importerjt × post Cold Wart is added, the effect of same orientationijt ×
post Cold Wart vanishes. Again, not surprisingly, worldwide market trend and
exporter’s market trend are significant and positive in most specifications. The
geographical distance seems not significant, while the value of yearly overall bi-
lateral trade proxying for commercial friendship is significant indeed. The level of
importer’s human rights violations seems not to affect MCW trade, while the im-
porter’s democracy index polity importerjt is indeed significant. However, while
the main coefficient for polity importerjt is significantly positive, its interaction
term with post Cold Wart is also significant but negative in sign. This is con-
sistent with the fact that before 1990 democracy reflected block division, and also
with the ongoing worldwide democratization patterns. In fact the transition out of
Cold War coincided with the so-called Third Wave of Democratization (Hunting-
ton, 1991): between 1987 and 1997, 54 countries went through a process of (full or
partial) democratization (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2007). This is also reflected
in the Polity IV data I use: on the total sample of 168 countries, the median polity
score for period 1975-2004 is 0, while the median polity score for period 1990-2004
is 5.
3.6 Conclusions
All through the XXth century arms have been not only tradable goods, but also for-
eign policy instruments. Arms are traded for either strategic or economic benefits:
in any case, politics can influence the trade, and it actually does. The channels are
several: arms trade regulation in country’s sovereignty, export licenses exclusively
granted by governmental agencies, a relevant share of armament industry is state
property, and the arms production sector attracts subsidies and other measures in
defense of national industry. This chapter focuses on countries supplying arms
and investigates whether the exporter’s government being right-wing or left-wing
impacts the quantity of arms supplied to third countries. For this purpose, a bi-
lateral trade equation is estimated for years 1975-2004 using a TOBIT framework.
Results suggest that exporter’s chief executive being right-wing has a positive and
significant impact on arms exports. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency
to lower trade barriers, with its consequences on deregularization of heavy indus-
try exports, or a higher economic support toward armament sector as an important
part of national industry.
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3.7 Appendix C
Figure 1.C: Trends in MCW flows, 1975-2004
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Table 2.C: Descriptive Statistics
All exporters Only democratic exporters
N mean sd N mean s.d.
arms 139831 10 .79 97 .35 110721 8 .79 79 .15
polity exporter 133337 5 .85 6 .84 104227 9 .40 1 .36
polity importer 119343 -0 .15 7 .51 92504 0 .10 7 .48
same orientation 44673 0 .44 0 .50 36447 0 .41 0 .49
pgdp exporter 118443 10 .90 9 .12 101652 12 .35 9 .03
population exporter 133337 110 .77 234 .07 104227 54 .44 64 .56
pgdp importer 113757 4 .71 6 .41 89567 5 .11 6 .73
population importer 129415 28 .92 101 .89 101103 29 .66 105 .75
embargo 139831 0 .01 0 .11 110721 0 .02 0 .12
worldwide exports 139831 28 .07 8 .42 110721 27 .59 8 .20
total exports 139831 1 .59 3 .26 110721 1 .34 2 .73
distance 139277 6 .69 3 .92 110217 6 .56 3 .87
total trade 119724 0 .81 6 .30 91491 0 .98 7 .09
human right violations 58239 2 .73 1 .10 50926 2 .73 1 .10
74 Democracies, Politics and Arms Supply
Table 3.C: Panel TOBIT Results, Full Sample
Dependent variable: MCW trade
(1) (2) (3)
democratic exporter -0.722 -2921 -5064
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
pgdp exporter -0.030 0.796 1046
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
pgdp exporter× -0.843 -1298
democratic exporter (0.000)*** (0.000)***
population exporter 0.005 -0.000 -0.006
(0.000)*** (0.479) (0.000)***
population exporter× 0.080 0.086
democratic exporter (0.000)*** (0.000)***
pgdp importer 0.076 -0.085 -0.041
(0.000)*** (0.061)* (0.558)
pgdp importer× 0.138 0.251
democratic exporter (0.002)*** (0.000)***
population importer 0.029 0.031 0.031
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
population importer× -0.005 -0.008
democratic exporter (0.022)** (0.067)*
embargo -1166 0.091 -4886
(0.018)** (0.962) (0.049)**
embargo× -2003 3300
democratic exporter (0.316) (0.208)
conflict importer 0.839 0.512 0.366
(0.000)*** (0.247) (0.644)
conflict importer× 0.154 -0.017
democratic exporter (0.744) (0.984)
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Table 3.C: Panel TOBIT Results, Full Sample (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
distance -0.212 -0.171 -0.244
(0.000)*** (0.010)** (0.017)**
distance× -0.120 0.012
democratic exporter (0.040)** (0.909)
total trade 0.183 0.029 0.044
(0.000)*** (0.558) (0.536)
total trade× 0.079 0.119
democratic exporter (0.124) (0.112)
center exporter -1840
(0.000)***
left exporter -0.885
(0.000)***
constant 4382 6327 10998
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
observations 91450 91450 56683
n. groups 3580 3580 3204
exporter×importer
robust p-values in parenthesis
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%
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Table 4.C: Panel TOBIT Results, Democratic Exporters
Dependent variable: MCW trade
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
center
exporter
-1.383 -1.365 -1.705 -1.204 -2.390 -2.513 -2.809
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.033)** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)***
left
exporter
-0.441 -0.474 -0.751 -0.705 -1.229 -1.487 -1.913
(0.014)** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
pgdp
exporter
-0.238 -0.210 -0.124 -0.025 -0.118 0.058 0.064
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.393) (0.001)*** (0.279) (0.293)
population
exporter
0.0848 0.081 0.097 0.068 0.126 0.123 0.134
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
pgdp
importer
0.253 0.240 0.236 0.228 0.235 0.698 0.901
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
population
importer
0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
embargo -0.498 -2.148 -2.090 -3.828 0.807 0.266
(0.462) (0.231) (0.249) (0.043)** (0.696) (0.911)
internationalized
conflict
-0.707 0.441 0.333 -1.031 -2.547 -1.873
(0.286) (0.684) (0.759) (0.370) (0.075)* (0.272)
internal
conflict
0.542 3.001 3.151 2.737 2.238 2.271
(0.060)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)***
extrasistemic
conflict
0.600 0.739 0.451 -0.060 0.082 0.300
(0.331) (0.439) (0.639) (0.953) (0.949) (0.843)
same
orientation
1.089 1.161 1.068 1.831 1.263
(0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.114)
post
Cold War
-1.160 -1.999 -1.893 -2.874 -3.060
(0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.010)***
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Table 4.C: Panel TOBIT Results, Democratic Exporters (continued)
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
same orientation× -1.170 -1.254 -1.246 -2.089 -1.260
post Cold War (0.024)** (0.016)** (0.023)** (0.010)*** (0.193)
worldwide
exports
-0.021 -0.010 0.171 0.196
(0.565) (0.818) (0.009)*** (0.012)**
total exports 0.835 0.049 0.376 0.519
(0.000)*** (0.704) (0.058)* (0.023)**
distance -0.155 -0.049 0.021
(0.022)** (0.535) (0.810)
total trade 0.155 0.116 0.089
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
polity
importer
0.520 0.714
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
human rights -0.007 -0.317
violations (0.978) (0.318)
polity importer× -0.351
post Cold War (0.000)***
constant 2.776 2.050 1.109 0.822 1.155 -11.323 -12.791
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.044)** (0.621) (0.544) (0.000)*** (0.001)***
observations 57597 57597 33236 33236 28388 17057 17057
n.groups
exporter×importer2985 2985 2135 2135 2036 1760 1760
p-values in parenthesis;
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%
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3.8 Appendix D
National Export Control Systems 21
CANADA
Legislation: Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) as amended. Licensing Au-
thority: Export Controls Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT). Consultation Procedures: different branches within DFAIT, the
Department of National Defense, Industry Canada and other agencies (such as
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Po-
lice) are asked for specialist advice. End User Requirements:
in most cases one of the following will be required: International Import Certifi-
cate; End-use Certificate or Import license; Delivery Verification Certificate; End-
use Statement. Types of Licenses: most exports of military goods require a sin-
gle shipment/single consignee individual license. Some exports of military goods
may take place under a multiple shipment/single consignee individual license.
CHINA
Legislation: Decree of the State Council and the Central Military Commission of
the People’s Republic of China No. 234, 22 October 1997; Regulations of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on the Administration of Arms Export, 1 January 1998.
Licensing Authority: State Administration of Arms Trade of the People’s Repub-
lic of China. Consultation Procedures: items of arms export shall be examined and
approved by the State Administration of Arms Trade or by the State Administra-
tion of Arms Trade jointly with the relevant departments under the State Council
and the Central Military Commission.
CZECH REPUBLIC
Legislation: Act No. 38/1994 of the Legal Code of 15 February 1994. Licensing
Authority: Ministry of Industry and Trade. Consultation Procedures: State Secu-
rity Office in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs can request infor-
mation. End User Requirements: an end user certificate and non-reexport clause
should be submitted as part of the license request. Licensing Negotiations: li-
censes should be applied for after an applicant has received written intent from
the buyer to conclude a contract or an invitation to participate in a tender. Revoca-
tion Licenses: possible under conditions described in Act No. 38/1994. Types of
Licenses: only an individual license is used.
21Source: Sipri
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FRANCE
Legislation: Decree-law of 18 April 1939 creating a regime governing war mate-
rial, arms, and munitions; Decree no. 55-965 of 16 July 1955 reorganising the In-
terministerial Committee for the S; Law no. 98-564 of 8 July 1998 with the intent
of eliminating antipersonnel mines. Licensing Authority: Interministerial Com-
mission for the Study of Export of War Material (CIEEMG). In the case of dual-use
goods: the Service des Titres du Commerce Exte´rieur (SETICE). Consultation Pro-
cedures: Autorization for the Exportation of War Material (AEMG) delivered by
the Customs general directorate. Possible inspection by the CIEEMG, composed,
amongst others, of representatives from the Minister of Defense, the Minister of
Economy and Finance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. End User Require-
ments: not directly required. License can be subject to a signed agreement under-
taking not to reexport the controlled item. License can also be subject to the proof
that the controlled goods are delivered to the authorized recipients. French author-
ities can request that the controlled item not be reexported in the state in which it
was purchased. This is usually relevant in the sale of controlled components or
sub-units. Licensing Negotiations: all stages of the contract are controlled, as well
as pre-shipment activities. Prospecting, negotiation, and sale require an authoriza-
tion. Authorizations, when granted, last for one year and can be extended to three
years if agreed to by the CIEEMG . Licensing Exemptions: certain exemptions ex-
ist for transfer of certain classes of weapons within the European Community and
some material depending on its nature and destination e.g. temporary exports,
exports made by the Minister of National Defense. Revocation Licenses: possible
at any time. Types of Licenses: licenses are usually individual and apply to one
exporter for one group of goods and toward one destination. Licenses last for one
year.
GERMANY
Legislation: War Weapons Control Act, implementing Article 26(2) of the Basic
Law; War Weapons Reporting Ordinance of 24 January 1995 (as amended); For-
eign Trade and Payments Act of 28 April 1961 (as amended); Foreign Trade and
Payments Ordinance of 18 December 1986 (as amended). Licensing Authority: Fed-
eral Ministry for Economics in cases of war weapons. In cases of export of other
military equipment, the Federal Export Office (an agency of the Federal Ministry
of Economics). Consultation Procedures: Federal Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
Defence and with other Ministries if appropriate. End User Requirements: an
end user document must normally be submitted with the application. There are
three types of end user certificate: an official EUC (for government end users); a
private EUC (for company or private end users) and an International Import Cer-
tificate (IIC). Licensing Negotiations: no authorization required for negotiating
a contract; a special license is required for deals by intermediaries regarding the
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procurement of war weapons which are located abroad and are to be delivered to
the foreign customer without encountering German territory. Licensing Exemp-
tions: in certain cases, such as insignificant parts of firearms, military equipment
can be exported under a general license. Revocation Licenses: possible only under
narrow legal conditions such as a false statement in a license application. Types
of Licenses: there is no distinction between licenses based on destination; exports
within the framework of an intergovernmental cooperation project are covered by
a general license.
ITALY
Legislation: Law No. 185/90, 9 July 1990 (New Rules for the Control of Export,
Import and Transit of Conventional Weapons). Licensing Authority: Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of In-
dustry, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Finance (Customs), Treasury. End
User Requirements: an end-user certificate is required for all destinations. How-
ever, the certificate can take different forms depending on the destination. Import
certificates and delivery verification certificates are not verified if provided by the
governmental authorities of the importing countries. The end-user certificate also
includes a no re-export statement regarded as a contractual obligation between
Italy and the importing country. Licensing Negotiations: license applications are
examined on a case by case basis. Prior authorisation is required before a con-
tract is signed. Licensing Exemptions: the 1990 Law No. 185/90 does not apply
to the following: a) temporary exports directly effected by, or on behalf of the Cen-
tral Government, to implement its own arms and equipment programmes for the
armed forces and police; b) exports or concessions between governments for the
purposes of military aid, under the terms of international agreements; c) the tran-
sit of armaments and equipment to meet the needs of allied countries, as defined
in the Convention on the Status of NATO Forces, provided that waivers to Arti-
cles VI, XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Convention between the States signatories to
the North Atlantic Treaty are not invoked for any reason whatsoever. Revocation
Licenses: licenses can be revoked at any time. Types of Licenses: a national reg-
ister of companies operating in the field of planning, manufacture, import, export,
maintenance and servicing of military products is maintained. Only companies in
the register may receive permission to negotiate contracts for exports of military
list items. Only individual licenses are used. Special conditions can be attached to
an individual license (normally valid for 1 year) on a case-by-case basis.
NETHERLANDS
Legislation: Import and Export Law (1962); Decree on the Export of Strategic
Goods (1963). Related laws and decrees: the Decree on the Delivery of Declaration
3.8 APPENDIX D 81
of Strategic Goods forms the basis for International Import Certificates (IIC’s) and
Delivery Verification Certificates; the Decree on Financial Transactions for Strate-
gic Goods demands that a license is required in each case a Dutch legal or natural
person is financially involved in the trade of strategic goods that are in transit or
otherwise outside the European Union; the Law Governing Economic Violations
provides for the possibility of sanctions in cases of breaches of the aforementioned
regulations and sets the framework for control and enforceability; the Sanctions
Law provides for the possibility to implement recommendations, resolutions or
agreements of international organizations (such as the UN) on international trade
sanctions for military or other goods. Licensing Authority: applications for export
licenses are submitted to the Import and Export Licensing Branch of the Ministry of
Finance. Export licenses are issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the ba-
sis of information contained in the contract, in the International Import Certificate,
and/or in the end-user statement. Consultation Procedures: if the application in-
volves inter alia military equipment which is also in use by or specially developed
and designed for the Dutch armed forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consults
with the Ministry of Defense on the possible classification aspects. Subsequently,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs submits his advice, which plays an essential role
in the decision making process. If there are no objections with regard to the pro-
posed export, the export license is issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
End User Requirements: in principle, all military shipments require an Interna-
tional Import Certificate or an end-user certificate. Licensing Negotiations: the
formal application procedure requires the submission of a signed contract. There
is no official government authority required to enter into contract negotiations or
to sign contracts with foreign customers. Licensing Exemptions: no license is re-
quired for exports to Belgium and Luxembourg. Revocation Licenses: the Import
and Export Law provides for two possibilities to revoke export licenses: if the in-
formation provided by the licensee in order to receive the license appears to be
inaccurate or incomplete; or if there is a very urgent or serious reason, for example
war or the threat of war. Types of Licenses: there are two types of license: an
individual license for a shipment to an end-user in one country only, for one or for
different kinds of goods (value and quantity of the shipment have to be indicated
at the time of application); a global license, which is a more flexible means of li-
censing and allows multiple shipments of a range of goods to several destinations
(e.g. issued in case of a project in one or more countries).
NORWAY
Legislation: Law of 18 December 1987 no. 93 on Control over the Export of Strate-
gic Goods, Services and Technology; Ministry for Foreign Affairs Decree of 10
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January 1989 to implement export regulations for strategic goods, services and
technology. Licensing Authority: Section for Export Control, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Consultation Procedures: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs may consult
the Ministry of Defense in cases where an application to export has particularly
important implications to national defense or to participation in international de-
fense industrial cooperation. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs may consult the De-
fense Research Institute within the Ministry of Defense in cases where information
is required on technical aspects of the use of particular items. The Ministry for For-
eign Affairs may consult the Ministry of Economy in cases where an application
to export has important implications for Norwegian economic interests. End User
Requirements: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs may require end-user statements
in connection with the export of products included in lists I and II and with the
export of technology or provision of services in connection with all such products.
Licensing Negotiations: no authorization required for seller/buyer negotiations.
Licensing Exemptions: precursors to chemical weapons if the substance in ques-
tion makes up less than 10 percent of a mixture or forms a normal component of
consumer goods packaged for personal use, recovery and oil rig equipment that is
to be used in emergency assistance actions, arms that are cleared by Customs with
the authorization ”Declaration on temporary export of hunting or sporting guns”,
goods for use by the European Space Agency (ESA), goods, services and technolo-
gies for use on the Norwegian part of the Continental Shelf, or on board Norwe-
gian ships under a Norwegian flag, and Norwegian aircraft during international
flights. Types of Licenses: for items on List I an individual license (authorizing a
specified shipment to a single, specified recipient) will be required. For items on
List II a general license may be available, usually when exports are to recipients
in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzer-
land or the United States or when the recipient is located in a European Union
member state. A general license will be valid for 3 years.
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POLAND
Legislation: Decision of Council of Ministers Regulation of 14 September 1999
”On prohibition and limitation in foreign special trade”; Law of 29 November 2000
concerning international trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic sig-
nificance for state security and maintenance of international peace and security,
and amending selected laws. Licensing Authority: Ministry of Economy, Depart-
ment of Export Control. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the
State Protection Office. End User Requirements: it is necessary to provide an end-
user certificate for each export contract with a proper non-re-export clause to avoid
risk of transfers to states subject to UN embargoes, EU restrictions or accused of
supporting terrorism (as a minimum a ban on the reexport of commodities to the
states which are subject to UN embargoes). Licensing Negotiations: the Ministry
of Economy should be informed about negotiations and intent to offer controlled
items but no license is required. Licensing Exemptions: export of arms always
requires a permit. Revocation Licenses: export permits may be canceled in cases
where a company breaks the law and when the transfer causes threat to the na-
tional interest, state security or national foreign policy goals. Types of Licenses:
general licenses are used for export controls applied to dual-use goods. For con-
ventional arms an individual license is used. Individual license: always required
(including by those companies that do not require a general license) to carry out a
particular transaction (issued on a case-by-case basis). These may be of four kinds:
to enter into negotiations and provide an offer; to carry out export and/or import;
to carry out re-export; to carry out transit.
RUSSIA
Legislation: Federal law of the Russian Federation on Military-Technical Cooper-
ation of the Russian Federation With Foreign States, adopted by the State Duma
on 3 July 1998 and approved by the Federation Council on 9 July 1998; Russian
Federation Presidential Decree No 1953, ”to form the Russian Federation Com-
mittee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States”, 1 December 2000.
Licensing Authority: Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign
States. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense,
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics, State Customs Service, Foreign In-
telligence Service, Federal Security Service. End User Requirements: federal ex-
ecutive institutions of the Russian Federation shall supervise deliveries of mili-
tary products intended for transfer to foreign clients. Executive institutions moni-
tor the development, manufacture and delivery of military products according to
the procedure determined by the Government of the Russian Federation. Licens-
ing Negotiations: marketing and contract negotiations require authorization from
the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign States. Revoca-
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tion Licenses: organizations and enterprises require authorization to take part in
military-technical cooperation with foreign states. This authorization is subject to
review by the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign States
and can be withdrawn by that Committee.
SPAIN
Legislation: Royal Decree No. 491/1998 of 12 March 1998. Licensing Author-
ity: Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on Foreign Trade in Defense or Dual-Use
Material (JIMDDU) within the Ministry of Economy and Taxes. The Under-Director-
General for Foreign Trade of Defense and Dual-Use Material at the Ministry of
Economy and Taxes provides a secretariat for the Board. JIMDDU is chaired by
the Secretary of State for Trade, Tourism and Small and Medium Enterprises. The
Deputy Chair is Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consulta-
tion Procedures: represented on the Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on Foreign
Trade in Defense or Dual-Use Material are the Ministries of Trade, Tourism and
Small and Medium Enterprises, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Domestic
Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Energy. End User Requirements: an end-user
certificate issued by a government agency in the importing state is required for ex-
ports of war material. For other materials that are for military use an end-user
certificate may be issued by a company. If there are doubts about the final destina-
tion additional controls may be applied. Licensing Negotiations: no authorization
is needed to negotiate or sign a contract. Licensing Exemptions: none. Revocation
Licenses: licenses can be revoked: when the export might threaten peace or stabil-
ity on a regional or global level; when the export contravenes Spain’s international
commitments; when the export threatens Spain’s national defense or foreign pol-
icy interests. Types of Licenses: Individual licenses valid for 6 months are used
for war material exports.
SWEDEN
Legislation: Military Equipment Act (1992); Military Equipment Ordinance (1992).
Licensing Authority: The National Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP), which
is obliged to submit cases of principal significance or cases which are otherwise
important to the Government. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Ministry of Defense. End User Requirements: in principle required for all
exports. Licensing Exemptions: a private person may take small arms and am-
munition out of the country for his personal use if entitled under the Weapons Act
(1973). Revocation Licenses: a license may be revoked. Types of Licenses: only
one type of license used.
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SWITZERLAND
Legislation: Article 41 and article 64 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Con-
federation of 29 May 1874 (as amended); Federal Law on War Material of 13 De-
cember 1996; Federal Law on the control of dual use goods and specific military
goods of 13 December 1996; Ordinance on the exportation, importation, and tran-
sit of dual use goods and specific military goods of 25 June 1997; Ordinance on
War Material of 25 February 1998. Licensing Authority: designated by the Fed-
eral Council, the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs (OFAEE, Of-
fice Fe´de´ral des Affaires Economiques Exte´rieures) is authorized to issue licenses
(art. 13 of ordinance of 25 February 1998). Consultation Procedures: procedures
are established in art. 14 of ordinance of 25 February 1998 and are as follows:
1the OFAEE issues authorizations for further marketing authorizations in tandem
with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the OFAEE consults
the relevant branch of the Federal Department of Defense, of Civil Protection, and
Sports (DDPS) if political security or armament interests are in question. It con-
sults the Federal Office of Energy (OFEN) if nuclear issues are present; 3) the rel-
evant services decide whether requests are of major importance regarding foreign
or security policy and thus must be submitted to the Federal Council; 4) if the
relevant services cannot agree on the proper treatment of the requests the latter
are submitted the Federal Council; 5) in cases of minor importance or if there are
precedents, the relevant authorities can authorize the OFAEE to take decisions.
End User Requirements: Art. 18 of law of 13 December stipulates that export au-
thorizations are usually only issued for goods destined to foreign governments or
companies working for foreign governments, and a declaration that the goods will
not be reexported. The clause may not be required for parts destined to be inte-
grated (and are integrated) and then exported or for anonymous parts of negligi-
ble value. Licensing Negotiations: initial authorization required for commercial
activity including the process of offering, acquiring, and transferring. Brokerage
and transfer of intellectual property also subject to authorization (art. 6 ,9, and 20
of law of 13 December 1996). Licensing Exemptions: the licensing scheme is not
applicable to armament companies when their activities are related to acquisition
of material for the Swiss army (art. 4 of law of 13 December).Temporary export of
weapons by persons participating in firing competitions or training are exempt (art
9 of ordinance of 25 February 1998). Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked
or suspended in exceptional circumstances (art.19 of law of 13 December 1998).
Types of Licenses: Six types of authorization: manufacture, brokerage, importa-
tion, exportation, transit and intellectual property (art. 12 of law of 13 December
1996). Import, export, and transit licenses last 12 months and can be extended by
six months (art. 15 of ordinance of 25 February 1998).
UK
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Legislation: Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 (as amended). Export Con-
trol Act 2002. Licensing Authority: Department of Trade and Industry. Consulta-
tion Procedures: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, Depart-
ment for International Development. End User Requirements: provision of end-
user certificate including obligation not to re-export needed. Licensing Negotia-
tions: no authorization needed for negotiating contracts unless classified informa-
tion has to be released. Licensing Exemptions: government to government trans-
fers; companies acting on behalf of their governments: exemption on the grounds
of Crown Status; government to government collaborative projects. Revocation
Licenses: the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry may revoke export licenses
at any time and for any reason.
USA
Legislation: Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended). Licensing Authority:
Department of State. Consultation Procedures: The Department of State seeks the
views of the Department of Defense and other relevant specialist agencies (such
as the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA)) in around 30% of license
cases. End User Requirements: a Non-Transfer and Use Certificate is required as a
condition to the approval of any license or agreement that relates to significant mil-
itary equipment, classified articles or classified technical data. Written approval of
the Office of Defense Trade Controls must be obtained before reselling, transfer-
ring, transshipping or disposing of a defense article to any end user, end use or
destination other than that stated in the export license. Licensing Negotiations: a
marketing license is required for contacts with potential customers if information
or technical data covered by the US Munitions List is revealed in the course of the
contact. Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked at the discretion of the Pres-
ident and the Secretary of State under a wide range of circumstances. Types of
Licenses: there are 4 types of document that can authorize exports of controlled
items: 1) export licenses: Documents that permit the temporary or permanent ex-
port of items on the US Munitions List; 2) technical assistance agreements: a con-
tract for the delivery of a defense service or disclosure of technical data; 3) manu-
facturing licenses: a document whereby a US legal person grants a foreign person
authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad; 4) distribution agreements:
a contract to establish a warehouse or distribution point abroad for defense articles
exported from the US for subsequent distribution to entities in an approved sales
territory.
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UKRAINE
Legislation: Law on State Control of international Transfers of Goods Designated
for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods, 20 February, 2003; Decree no. 117/98
of the President of Ukraine, 13 February 1998; Decree no. 422/99 of the Presi-
dent of Ukraine, 21 April 1999; Decree no. 423/97 of the President of Ukraine, 13
May 1997; Provisions approved by Decree no. 1005 of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine, 22 June 1996; Provisions approved by Decree no. 125 of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, 4 February 1997 with changes according to Decree no. 1042
by the Cabinet of Ministers 15 June 1999; Provisions approved by Decree no. 1358
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 8 December 1997; Decree no. 1228 of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 12 July 1999;Decree no. 473 of the Cabinet of Min-
isters of Ukraine, 10 March 2000. Licensing Authority: State Service on Export
Control. Consultation Procedures: the Commission on Export Control Policy and
Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries, which is now under
the authority of the Presidential Administration. End User Requirements: deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis. Licensing Negotiations: an exporter requires per-
mission from the State Service on Export Control to begin contract negotiations
with a foreign customer. Licensing Exemptions: none. Revocation Licenses: li-
censes can be revoked or suspended if: there are reasons to believe that the end-
use of the items run counter to the information contained in the license application;
the exporter becomes bankrupt or ceases to exist; the terms of the contract with the
foreign partner that was the basis for the license application was altered after the
license was issued; or if the transfer violates Ukraine’s international obligations.
Types of Licenses: general and individual licenses are available.
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